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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
NASRULLAKHAN, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
THE STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE, 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
SAFETY, 
MR. ROBERT L. FLOWERS, 
MS. JANELL B. TUTTLE, 
ETAL., 
Defendants/Appellees. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(a), 
(2)(b), and/or (2)0. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
a. The District Court committed abuses of discretion. 
Standard of review: "Where the trial court may exercise broad discretion, we presume 
the correctness of the court's decision absent manifest injustice or inequity that indicates a 
clear abuse of discretion." Childsv. Childs, Case No. 971258-CA(UtahApp. 1998). Abuse 
of discretion is "an appellate court's standard for reviewing a decision that is asserted to be 
grossly unsound, unreasonable, or illegal" (Black's Law Dictionary). 
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b. The District Court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous. 
Standard of review: "We will overturn the [trial] court's findings of fact only if they are 
clearly erroneous. For a reviewing court to find clear error, it must decide that the factual 
findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the record, resolving all 
disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's determination." State v 
Greuber, 2007 UT 50, P. 6. 
c. The District Court erred by granting Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Standard of review: "We review the trial court's grant of summary judgment for 
correctness, according no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law." Potter v. Chadaz, 
977 P.2d 533, 535 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). "We view the facts and inferences in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, and affirm only when there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Id. at 535-
36. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, & RULES 
The following are determinative of this appeal: Utah Code §§63-2-102, 63-2-103, 63-2-
201, 63-2-204, 63-2-205, 63-2-401, 63-2-403, and 63-2-404; Administrative Rules R35-1-4 
and R35-2-2; Retention Reports labeled as Series 2266, 81804, 84406, 84410, 84416, 
10546, 6314,16944, 84409, 84381, 84411 & 24018 (R. 151-158; R. 160-163); UtahR. Civ. 
P. 4; Utah R. Civ. P. 52; Utah R. Civ. P. 56. They are set forth verbatim in the Addendum. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: This case arises out of Appellant's Government Records Access and 
Management Act ("GRAMA") request to the Utah Department of Public Safety ("DPS") for 
records relevant to his complaints to DPS. 
Course of Proceedings: On November 8, 2002, Appellant Nasrulla Khan (hereinafter 
referred to as "Khan") had sent his complaints to DPS about continuing crimes and terrorism 
against him by some people, and about the illegal actions of the Ogden City Police officials 
concerning his complaint to them of those crimes and terrorism. On August 29,2005, he 
had sent a written GRAMA request to DPS for records relevant to his November 8,2002, 
complaints to DPS; he requested records of DPS investigators and officials relevant to his 
complaints. DPS did not give a response to his GRAMA request, or did not provide him the 
requested records, or did not issue a denial. Khan then filed the GRAMA appeal to the 
Chief Administrative Officer ("CAO") of DPS, who denied his GRAMA appeal. He then 
filed the notice of appeal to the State Records Committee, which did not schedule a hearing. 
Khan filed the Petition for judicial review by the district court of the State Records 
Committee's order, and he amended his Petition. Khan served his request for production 
of documents and things, and Appellees produced some relevant records. He filed a 
motion to compel discovery, and they produced some more relevant records. Appellees 
filed their motion for summary judgment, and Khan filed his memorandum in opposition. 
Disposition in the district court: The district court entered findings of fact and conclusions, 
and granted Appellees1 motion for summary judgment on March 21,2007. 
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RELEVANT FACTS 
On November 8, 2002, Appellant Khan had sent his complaints to the Utah Homeland 
Security Department about continuing crimes and terrorism against him by some people, and 
about the illegal actions of the Ogden City Police officials concerning his complaint to them 
of those crimes and terrorism (see Addendum B, R. 373). (The Utah Homeland Security 
Department is an agency in DPS.) In December 2002, Mr. John Keyser of DPS had traveled 
to Ogden City to meet with Khan regarding his complaints (R. 370-371); Mr. Keyser had 
looked at some of the evidence Khan had brought to that meeting, and he had written down 
his notes. Then, Khan had not received any communication from DPS; hence, early in the 
year 2003, he had written to Mr. Scott Behunin and Mr. Sidney Groll of DPS, and to the 
Governor of Utah about his November 8, 2002, complaints to DPS (Addendum B, R. 373). 
DPS Investigator, Mr. Jim Keith, had written to Khan in April 2003; during April and May 
of 2003, they had corresponded about Khan's November 8, 2002, complaints; then, Mr. 
Keith had stopped communicating with Khan. Khan had, then, written to DPS officials, 
including Mr. Robert Flowers and Mr. Verdi White, and to the Governor. Then, in June 
2003, DPS Agent, Mr. Doug Miller, had written to Khan; during June and July of 2003, they 
had corresponded about Khanfs November 8, 2002, complaints; then, Mr. Miller had stopped 
communicating with Khan. Khan had, then, again written to DPS officials including Mr. 
Flowers and Mr. White, and to the Governor. 
On January 26, 2005, Khan wrote to the Governor requesting him to have DPS 
thoroughly and unbiasedly investigate the crimes and terrorism against him (R. 149, 
4 
DPS/SRC 9-11). On February 4,2005, Captain Mitch McKee of DPS responded: "Our 
agency has looked into your complaints on various occasions, including sending an 
investigator to speak with you. We have found no evidence to support your claims and no 
further action will be taken by us at this time." (R. 262). On February 15,2005, Khan wrote 
to Mr. McKee to inform Khan of the name of the investigator who was sent to speak with 
him, and requested Mr. McKee to send him a copy of the reports of that investigator, and of 
Mr. Keith, Mr. Miller, Mr. Behunin, Mr. Groll, Mr. Flowers and Mr. White concerning his 
complaints to DPS (R. 389; Addendum B, R. 373). On May 23, 2005, Mr. McKee referred 
Khan to the February 4, 2005, letter, and wrote: "The officer who interviewed you at the 
Library was Agent John Keyser. We found no evidence to support your claims and this 
department has taken no action. [DPS] considers this matter closed" (R. 148, DPS/SRC 5); 
he did not send Khan copies of the reports of the above-named DPS officers. 
On August 29, 2005, Khan sent a written Government Records Access and Management 
Act ("GRAMA") request to DPS for records relevant to his November 8,2002, complaints 
to DPS about "terrorism and crimes against [him], and about the illegal actions of the Ogden 
City Police;" he requested records of Mr. Behunin, Mr. Groll, Mr. Keith, Mr. Miller, Mr. 
McKee, Mr. Keyser, Mr. Flowers and Mr. White relevant to his November 8,2002, 
complaints to DPS (Addendum B, R. 299 & 373). He sent his GRAMA request to DPS 
pursuant to Utah Code §63-2-204(1); DPS did not give a response to his GRAMA request, 
or did not provide him the requested records, or did not issue a denial. (§63-2-204(3)(a) and 
§63-2-205)). On September 19, 2005, Khan timely filed the GRAMA appeal to the Chief 
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Administrative Officer of DPS pursuant to §63-2-401; he enclosed a copy of his August 29, 
2005, GRAMA request with that appeal. (R. 301). On October 3, 2005, DPS Commissioner 
Robert Flowers gave his determination on Khan!s GRAMA appeal: 
In your original request, you asked for records of the department regarding 
"complaints of terrorism and crimes against me, and about the illegal actions of 
the Ogden City Police against me." This is the same request you have made on 
several prior occasions to the Department of Public Safety. You have also 
requested records of Agent John Keyser regarding his investigation of you. 
Captain Mitch McKee has previously notified you that the department has never 
conducted such an investigation and that there are no records that satisfy your 
request. John Keyser spoke with you regarding your complaints of terrorism and 
crimes against you by Ogden City. No evidence was found to support your 
claims and no formal investigation was conducted. The Department of Public 
Safety closed this matter. The Department of Public Safety does not have any 
records that satisfy your GRAMA request. Therefore, this is a denial of your 
Government Records Access and Management Act appeal. 
(Addendum B, R. 11). DPS and Mr. Flowers did not provide Khan any records with this 
determination. 
On November 1, 2005, pursuant to Utah Code §63-2-403, Khan timely filed the notice 
of appeal to the State Records Committee appealing the denial of his GRAMA appeal by 
the Chief Administrative Officer of DPS; he rebutted the arguments stated in that denial (R. 
15-18). The State Records Committee's order of November 7, 2005, states: "According to 
Administrative Rule R35-2-2(b), the claim that a record does not exist does not constitute a 
denial. Sufficient facts have not been alleged to determine that the records do exist and 
therefore I cannot schedule a hearing" (R. 8). The Records Committee did not provide Khan 
any records with its order. On November 7,2005, Administrative Rule R35-2-2(b) stated: 
"The claim that a record does not exist does not constitute a denial unless the petitioner can 
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provide sufficient evidence in his or her statement of facts, reasons, and legal authority in 
support of appeal that record did exist at one time." (Addendum C, R. 9). 
On December 6, 2005, Khan timely filed the Petition for judicial review by the Third 
District Court of the State Records Committee's order, pursuant to Utah Code §63-2-404(1). 
(R. 1-11). On April 6, 2006, he amended his Petition; he added Mr. Flowers, Ms. Turtle, and 
DPS as respondents, and negligence claims (R. 33-44); by stipulation, the negligence claims 
and Mr. Flowers and Ms. Turtle were dismissed. He stated that Appellees violated his 
constitutional right and his statutory right as his injuries (R. 42), and that they violated the 
GRAMA (R. 39). He stated his requests for relief (R. 42). 
On July 5, 2006, Khan served his request for production of documents and things (R. 
168-172); Appellees served their response (R. 139-147), and produced to him records, the 
Administrative Rules, and the retention reports ("retention policies"), including retention 
policies R. 151-158 and R. 160-163, and Administrative Rules R35-1-4 and R35-2-2. (R. 
306-309, DPS/SRC 1-202). On September 1, 2006, he filed a motion for an order 
compelling discovery (R. 131-172); on September 13, 2006, Appellees filed their 
memorandum in opposition to Khan's motion to compel discovery and in support of their 
motion for protective order (R. 184-195); on September 27, 2006, he filed his reply 
memorandum to Appellees' memorandum opposing his motion to compel discovery and his 
memorandum opposing their motion for protective order (R. 211-222); on October 2,2006, 
Appellees filed their reply memorandum in support of their motion for protective order (R. 
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225-230). Appellees produced to him more records (R. 309-310, DPS/SRC 203-226), 
including Mr. Miller's Investigation Reports (Addendum B, R. 221 & 222). 
At the hearing on December 19,2006, the court ordered Appellees to give Khan two 
privileged Investigation Reports after redacting those (Addendum A, R. 264, para. 2; R. 246; 
R. 513, pages 5-7), which they later gave him (R. 369-372 & R. 373-374). At that hearing, 
the court instructed Appellees1 Attorney Ferre: "do a motion for summary judgment... with 
affidavits indicating what searches youVe made and what youVe done, and I think that that's 
how we finally dispose of the case" (R. 513, pages 10-11). 
Khan filed an objection to the proposed order (R. 255-262); the court granted that order, 
and denied his motion to compel discovery (Addendum A, R. 263-265). On December 13, 
2006, he filed a motion for imposition of costs, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 4(f)(4) (R. 237-
245, 247-252); it is pending in the court. 
On January 25, 2007, Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment with affidavits (R. 
266-319); on February 13, 2007, Khan filed his memorandum in opposition to the motion 
for summary judgment with his affidavit (R. 320-420); and on February 22,2007, Appellees 
filed their reply memorandum (R. 421-435). There was no hearing on the motion. The 
district court entered its findings of fact, its "undisputed material facts," and its conclusions 
in its Order, and granted Appellees1 motion for summary judgment on March 21,2007. 
(Addendum A, R. 438-444). Khan, then, timely filed this appeal. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Khan argued the following actions of the district court resulted in manifest injustice or 
inequity, indicating abuses of discretion by the court: (1) the court based its Order on the 
judicial review of the DPS Commissioner's determination, instead of on the State Records 
Committee's order or decision; (2) the court misunderstood or misapplied the law and the 
Administrative Rule; (3) the court's rulings: "[Appellees] have complied with GRAMA, 
have acted appropriately under the law," and granted them summary judgment are incorrect 
or erroneous; (4) the court's grant of summary judgment was premature because Khan had 
not completed discovery; (5) the court did not give its decision on a pending motion and the 
reliefs Khan had requested; and (6) the court's bias against Khan. 
The court wrote the following findings of fact: Khan petitioned the court for judicial 
review of the DPS Commissioner's response; an Administrative Rule requires a party 
appealing a denial to provide sufficient evidence in the petitioner's statement of facts, 
reasons, and legal authority in support of the appeal,... or that the governmental entity has 
concealed, or not sufficiently or improperly searched for the record; the DPS Commissioner 
of Public Safety stated "no evidence was found to support your claims and no formal 
investigation was conducted, DPS does not have any records that satisfy your GRAMA 
request," and denied Khan's GRAMA appeal; Khan sent DPS more than one request on 
August 29, 2005, and sent a second request to the DPS CAO on September 19,2005; 
Appellees have supported their claims that they have no such records, and no records exist; 
Khan has not shown defendants did anything other than all they could; Appellees submitted 
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affidavits from the people involved in attempting to locate the records; the material facts of 
this case are those pertaining to plaintiffs GRAMA requests and the department's response 
to his requests; defendants have complied with the applicable laws, requirements and 
procedures of GRAMA, have given Khan information to which he was entitled in response 
to his requests, defendants have complied with GRAMA and have acted appropriately under 
the law, and court is not persuaded that there truly remains any actual dispute of any material 
fact; and Khan requested access to particular governmental information. Khan marshaled all 
of the relevant evidence which supported the findings, and then demonstrated that these 
findings are not adequately supported by the record, and that they are contrary to the clear 
weight of the evidence; hence, he argued that the findings of the court are clearly erroneous. 
Khan argued that the court erred in granting Appellees the summary judgment. He 
showed that the court's findings of fact and the court's "Undisputed Material Facts" are 
clearly erroneous, and the court's Order is erroneously based on the court's judicial review of 
the DPS Commissioner's determination instead of being based on the judicial review of the 
State Records Committee's order or decision; hence, he argued that the court's ensuing 
conclusion of granting summary judgment is erroneous. He showed that the court expressed 
a doubt or uncertainty concerning question of fact about the production of all of the material 
records by Appellees. Khan showed that there are doubts or uncertainties concerning 
questions of fact as to whether Appellees gave him all of the material, responsive, and 
existing records and information, and as to the accuracy and validity of their affidavits. He 
disputed the court's "Undisputed Material Facts." He argued that Appellees failed to comply 
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with the GRAMA, the applicable laws and procedures, their retention policies, and the 
Administrative Rules. He argued that discovery was not complete. Khan argued that 
because Appellees did not give him all of the existing, material, responsive information and 
public records, they also violated his legal right of access to unrestricted public records and 
his constitutional "right of access to information concerning the conduct of the public's 
business." Khanfs statement of material facts in his affidavit are in conflict with Appellees' 
statement of material facts in their affidavits. Appellees and Khan have disputed each 
other's material facts. Based upon all of these arguments, Khan argues that there are 
genuine issues as to material facts, and that Appellees are not entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. 
DETAILS OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED ABUSES OF DISCRETION. 
(1). At the hearing on December 19,2006, the court ordered Appellees1 Attorney Ferre to 
"do a motion for summary judgment... with affidavits indicating what searches youVe 
made and what youVe done, and I think that that's how we finally dispose of the case" (R. 
513, pages 10-11). Khan argues that this shows that the court assisted the Appellees by 
instructing them what they should do next and what things should be in their motion for 
summary judgment, in order for the court and Appellees to "finally dispose of [Khan's] 
case." He argues that on that date, even before Appellees had written their summary 
judgment motion, the court had already decided to "dispose of [his] case." After Appellees 
filed their summary judgment motion with their affidavits in accordance with the court's 
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detailed and beneficial guidance or instructions to them, the court granted it. Khan argues 
that the court used Appellees' wordings from their pleadings for most of its findings in its 
Order. He argues that all of these show the court's bias against him in this case and by 
granting that summary judgment motion, and that he suffered manifest injustice or inequity 
in this case. The last comment of the court speaks for itself. "Where the trial court may 
exercise broad discretion, we presume the correctness of the court's decision absent manifest 
injustice or inequity that indicates a clear abuse of discretion." Childs, Case No. 971258-CA. 
Therefore, Khan argues that the court abused its discretion. 
(2). Utah Code §63-2-404(1) states: "(a) Any party to a proceeding before the records 
committee may petition for judicial review by the district court of the records committee's 
order.. . . (c) The records committee is a necessary party to the petition for judicial review." 
Khan had filed his notice of appeal to the State Records Committee (R. 15-18); hence, he 
was a party to the proceeding before that Committee. The Records Committee issued its 
order on his notice of appeal (R. 8-10). On December 6, 2005, Khan filed his petition for 
judicial review by the district court of the State Records Committee's order (R. 1-11); later, 
he filed his amended petition for judicial review by the district court of the State Records 
Committee's order (R. 33-44). In its "Undisputed Material Facts" (Addendum A, R. 441), 
the district court's Order states: "On December 6, 2005 [Khan] then petitioned this Court for 
judicial review of the [DPS] Commissioner's response" (Addendum A, R. 442). Khan 
disputes this "material fact" of the court, because his Petition and amended Petition state 
judicial review of "the State Records Committee's order" (R. 1 & R. 33). In his Affidavit, 
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Khan wrote: "On December 6,2005,1 filed my Petition for Judicial Review by this District 
Court of the State Records Committee's order, pursuant to Utah Code §63-2-404" (R. 418, 
paras. 35 & 36); Appellees did "not dispute the alleged facts in paragraphs 35, 36" (R. 429, 
para. 25), and, hence, they themselves agreed with Khan that his Petition and amended 
Petition were for judicial review by the district court of the "State Records Committee's 
order," pursuant to the Utah Code. Because Utah Code §63-2-404(l)(a) clearly states 
"judicial review by the district court of the records committee's order," Khan argues that the 
district court's Order is erroneously based on the court's judicial review of the "[DPS] 
Commissioner's response" (Addendum B, R. 11), as stated in the Order (Addendum A, R. 
442), instead of being based on the court's judicial review of the State Records Committee's 
order or decision (R. 8). Also, the court's Order reviews and discusses the response of DPS, 
and does not review and discuss the order or decision of the Records Committee 
(Addendum A, R. 442-444). Hence, Khan argues that the court has erred by basing its Order 
on the judicial review of the wrong response, i.e., the court based its Order on the judicial 
review of the DPS Commissioner's response, instead of basing that Order on the judicial 
review of the State Records Committee's order or decision. Thus, the court misunderstood 
or misapplied the Utah Code or law. Hence, Khan argues that the court's Order is invalid or 
erroneous, and that manifest injustice or inequity has resulted. "We will disturb the trial 
court's [decision] only if there is a misunderstanding or misapplication of the law such that a 
manifest injustice or inequity results, indicating an abuse of discretion." Oliekan v. Oliekan, 
2006 UT. App. 405; Childs, Case No. 971258-CA. "We will not overturn its decision unless 
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it is manifest that the trial court has misapplied proven facts." Ferrin v. Ferrin, 315 P.2d 978, 
980 (1957). Therefore, Khan argues that the district court committed an abuse of discretion, 
an error in law, and an irregularity in its Order. 
(3). In its Order, the court stated: "[Appellees] have complied with GRAMA, [and] have 
acted appropriately under the law." (Addendum A, R. 444). Khan argues as follows: 
(a). In response to Khan's request for production of documents and his motion to compel 
(R. 168-172, & R. 131-167), Appellees also produced two documents: DPS Agent Doug 
Miller's "Investigation Reports" (Addendum B, R. 221 & 222). Khan argues that these 
Reports have been altered or tampered with, and the material information on the 
investigations is missing from those two "Investigation Reports," which are dated 
06/05/2003. In the "Synopsis" section of the Reports (Addendum B, R. 221 & 222), there is 
a note dated 8-23-06, i.e., more than three years later, concerning Appellees1 Attorney Ferre 
in this case; this case was filed in December 2005, long after 06/05/2003. Hence, on 
06/05/2003, Mr. Miller could not have written that note in his Investigation Reports about 8-
23-06 and Attorney Ferre; Khan argues that that note was added in the two Investigation 
Reports on 8-23-06, more than three years later, and during the discovery process in this 
case. There is nothing else in the Synopsis section. He argues that the actual synopsis and 
information, which are in these two official Reports, have been concealed or covered up. 
The note also states: ?A cover sheet with the case number and a short synopsis was "faxed" 
to Mr. Ferre on 8-23-06.' (Id.). Appellees and their Attorney Ferre did not produce the 
"synopsis," which is a part of each of the two Reports and which Attorney Ferre has or had 
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while the discovery was ongoing on 8-23-00. khan argues IIMI MI. I1 hllu's Investigation •' 
Reports are direc ^mber 8, ^ l mplaints to DPS 
of terroi ism against him (Addendum B, R. 373), because these Reports have been assigned • 
Case Number: 2003-00876 by DPS, and the headings state: "SIDRM TERRORISTIC 
THREATSNASRUi . K- . , «..., .A l i i ' K v • i s .. 
*"• *
 r i^-v >>P '^ , K -ROMCONl ^sec Addendum B, R. 
zzl & 222). Khan did not receive the "letter" referenced in these Reports from Mr. Miller 
or DPS, and Appellees did not produce it. These Reports arc a *M* ui.,tih ielevantand 
responsive to his UKAIVIA request (Addenda ipeals ( R, w 11 < ' 
I i Ini qtpdif c/ '"i i i i m i it '1, iMii I ;cn*c, has or had in his possession uie tlb>TiopsisM while the 
request for production of documents was in progress on 8-23-06 in this case, but yet he 
failed to produce it. Khan, argues that since D,fS or Mr. Miller sent these Investigation "•:•;• ' 
Reports to Attorney him/ uti ' \ (Hi, these l\i 11 imuik it i.iilll JIIKI mi »inni ,ivc Reports, synopsis, 
information, and the "letter" exist and have existed ainec 06/05/2003, He .argues that 
Appellees and their attorney, Mr. Ferre, did not produce the true, complete, and actual copies 
of these material, responsive, and existing, ollin.il Investigation Report?-' oI'Mr I dilli i lllllll(, 
existing synopsis, " line e\isiinj„»; "letter," the existing cover sheet, and the existing 
information; that instead, they produced altered, inaccurate, and or incomplete Reports 
(Addendum B, R. 221 & ???^ in response to m •* discovery reonesi. Khan argues that these 
actions of Appellees« • J - •. :e and/or inequity '. 
Heece, 1 le argi les that Appellees did not comply with the GRAMA, the applicable laws, and 
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the court rules on discovery, and that they acted inappropriately under the law. The 
foregoing evidence and facts do not support the court's ruling: "[Appellees] have complied 
with GRAMA, [and] have acted appropriately under the law" (Addendum A, R. 444). Khan 
argues that the court's ruling falls outside the bounds of reason under the relevant facts and 
evidence. Therefore, he argues that the court's ruling is incorrect or erroneous, that manifest 
injustice or inequity has resulted, and that the court committed an abuse of discretion. 
Childs, Case No. 971258-CA. 
(b). In his Affidavit, Mr. Rick Wyss, legal counsel for DPS, wrote: 
4. I reviewed and drafted the response signed by Commissioner Robert Flowers 
dated October 3, 2005 to Mr. Khan's public records request that is subject of this 
case. 5. In his request, Mr. Khan requested documents regarding complaints of 
terrorism and crimes against him. I was unable to locate any documents the 
Department possessed that were responsive to his request because [DPS] never 
conducted such an investigation.... 8. I have been unable to locate other records 
in the Department's possession that pertain to Mr. Khan.. . . 10. So far as I am 
aware, those non-privileged records the Department could locate that did or may 
have pertained to Mr. Khan have been made available to Mr. Khan. 
(R. 304-305). In her Affidavit, Ms. Janell Turtle wrote: "4. I was the official records 
custodian of the Records Committee, and I recorded or supervised the recording of the 
minutes of the Records Committee's meetings. 5. In the course of this case . . . I did not 
find any records beyond those listed on the attached index. 6. I provided the non-privileged 
documents . . . to Assistant Attorney General Joel Ferre . . . 7. the Records Committee . . . 
has no other records,... pertaining to Mr. Khan." (R. 313-314). In Khan's GRAMA request 
(Addendum B, R. 299), he requested records concerning his complaints to DPS about 
"terrorism and crimes against me, and about the illegal actions of the Ogden City Police;" in 
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his sworn Affidavit, Mi , Wyss clearly omiUeil i<» mi nitin.ni k h:ni,<? emtif lam) nl ""'(Itr fl|n»;t! 
action1, nl lhc ( )j"«iini ( 'ilv l\>ln c " Uefoiv Khan filnl tin1 Polilion to the court Appellees. 
Mr. Wyss, and Ms. Turtle did not provide him any records (Addendum B, R. 
response to his GRAMA request (Addendum B, R. 299) and GRAMA appeals (K . • 
• • . • •; alter he filed the Petition and served dv>\ nveiy icquest, Appell<*< 
i\r, i mm- imuhirnl siiiin;- records (R 26,2, 376-378, 387, 389; R. 148-149, DPS/SRC 1-13; 
R. 309-310, DPS/SRC 204-212, 214-226) and Investigation Reports (R. 369-374; 
* lendum B, R. 221, 222) that were responsive to In.* M<A.\*; * request, ine Investigation 
Keports indicau. . - < mluctcd invesdj. 
ci miplamt1; (<»1 »,liH 11 /Addendum B, R. 373). These Investigation Reports and the records are 
dated from November 8, 2002 (Id.) to before August 29, 2uto and. ^ n c e . existed before 
October 3, 2005, (Addendum B, R 11) and before Khan tiled Ins UK.- US IA icqucsl on ..' . 
August 29, 2005 ( addendum B,R , 299) 11 : >f these records contradict Mr. Wyss's (and 
the DPS's) official response of October 3, 2005, and his sworn statements in his Affidavit. 
that DPS "never conducted such an investigation" and "there are no records that satisfy your 
[GRAMA] request." | K .MM paia. '> Is' III M U M Ji Addniifiiiiiiii III III' I I I I H'S ,n Il 1 II in 
Records Committee have their retention policies and Administrative Rules that require them 
to retain official records for the specified periods of time (Addendum C), but they did not 
produce many of those retained, responsive, material records and inlnnnalion uMicomnig 
Khan's complaints IIIMMII l l r II imiisin rind crimes apainsl him ami about the illegal actions 
of the Ogden City Police. Executive Secretary Turtle wrote in her sworn Affidavit that she 
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"recorded or supervised the recording of the minutes of the Records Committee's meetings" 
(R. 313, para. 4); hence, Khan argues that the minutes of the meeting on his GRAMA appeal 
and the reports on the declining of hearing on his GRAMA appeal exist, because 
Administrative Rules R35-2-2(b), (d), (f) and (h), (Addendum C, R. 9 & 10), and Rule R35-
1-4 (Addendum C) require those to be retained; Appellees and Ms. Turtle did not produce 
those responsive, existing, material records. Mr. Wyssfs and Ms. Turtle's sworn statements 
indicate that there exist relevant, material records, other than the non-privileged records, that 
they have not produced (R. 305, para. 10; R. 313, para. 6). Hence, based upon all of the 
foregoing, Khan argues that legal counsel Wyssfs sworn Affidavit (R. 303-305), the official 
response of October 3,2005, which Wyss reviewed and drafted for DPS CAO (Addendum 
B, R. 11; R. 304, para. 4) to Khan's GRAMA appeal, and Ms. Turtle's sworn Affidavit (R. 
312-314) contain misrepresentations and are misleading. He also argues that Appellees did 
not produce many responsive, existing, material records, which they are required to retain, 
and that their refusal or failure to produce those material records have resulted in manifest 
injustice and/or inequity. Therefore, he argues that Mr. Wyss's and Ms. Turtle's sworn 
affidavits, for Appellees, are false or invalid, that they and Appellees violated the GRAMA, 
official retention policies and Administrative Rules, and that they acted inappropriately 
under the law. The foregoing facts and evidence do not support the court's ruling: 
"[Appellees] have complied with GRAMA, [and] have acted appropriately under the law." 
(Addendum A, R. 444). Khan argues that the court's ruling falls outside the bounds of 
reason under the relevant facts and evidence. Therefore, he argues that the court's ruling is 
18 
incorrect or erroneous, that manifest injustice or inequity has resulted, an< I Ihni lite o \\\\ < 
committed an abuse nlMisciehon. < 'liilcls, I 'asv N<> M"7P\S'..r\ • •'• •  • ..,; ...•...•• 
DPS and the State Records Committee have their official retention policies and 
Administrative Rules that require them to retain official records (see \ddendum C) nrur 
retention policies specify wlJ.a; aiui i,.. ... .. ..*,^ . . . -^ .,• » .«* ,„u cse 
(i IIMI'I, nii| " Mlniiiiiiihii'iiiu II'MIII inn iiuii n:il to III! I'JJSO because they are applicable to the 
records and information pertaining to Khan's complaints to DPS on November, 8, 2002 
(Addendum B, R. 373) and pertaining to his GRAMA request (Addendum B, R. 299) and 
GRAMA appeals (. 
Administrative Rules he identified are applicable to this case (Addendum C; R. 411, paras. 
23-27), but Appellees dispute that those are applicable to this case (R, 425, paras. 16.& 17). 
He argues that Appellees did not provide nim ana produce many of the material and existing 
reeoitls und iiiloimulnm irle1 'ml lo hi nm|il mil. In DPS th;il thc\ are required to retain, in 
response to his GRAMA request (Addendum B, R. 299) and (JRAM A appeals (R. 301, 15-
18) to them, and in response to his discovery request (R. 168-172, & 131-167). Appellees : 
created some of those material recorc 
existing , matei ial records and information because those may create genuine issues of • 
material facts sufficient to defeat the summary judgment motion. Iw his sworn Affidavit, Mr. 
Wyss, legal counsel for DPS, wrote: "I have been unable to locate ot ^i \ ,;COM: I 
Department's possession that pertain to \ Ir. Khan" (R 305,, para 8); : * -—• -r-rr Affidavit. 
Ms. Janell Turtle wrote: "the Records Committee . . . has no other records,... pertainir.^ 
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Mr. Khan." (R. 314, para. 7). Khan argues that he finds it shocking and unbelievable that 
many critical, material, official records and information concerning his complaints of crimes 
and terrorism against him and of illegal actions ofOgden Police officials, and concerning 
his numerous correspondences with DPS investigators and officers about those serious 
complaints of his are, according to Appellees, not at DPS and/or the State Records Center. 
DPS's Peace Officers Standards and Training Division certifies or licenses Utah police 
officials (R. 429, para. 24); hence, it would investigate a complaint of illegal actions of 
Ogden Police officials. As Khan has stated above, before he filed the Petition to the court 
on December 6, 2005, Appellees did not provide him any records stating that DPS "does not 
have any records that satisfy your GRAMA request" (Addendum B, R. 11), but after he filed 
the petition (R. 1-13 & 33-43) and discovery request (R. 168-172), they produced some 
records which were material to his GRAMA request (R. 262, 376, 378,387,389; R. 148-
149, DPS/SRC 1-13). He, then, filed a motion to compel (R. 131-167), and they produced 
Investigation Reports (R. 369-374; Addendum B, R. 221 & 222) and some more records (R. 
262, 377, 378, 387; R. 309-310, DPS/SRC 204-212, 214-226) that were material to his 
GRAMA request. He argues that their reluctance to provide him and produce the material 
records and information, and that their misleading, false, written, official responses to his 
formal GRAMA appeals clearly indicate the unreliability and invalidity of their official 
responses, and their failure to comply with the GRAMA, the applicable laws, the retention 
policies and the Administrative Rules. Also, if he had not filed his Petition to the court, he 
would have not received any responsive, existing records and information at all, and his 
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constitutional right, the GR A.IV1A, and the applicable laws would ha\ e "been clearly violated 
by Appellees. Hence, khan aigut's llluil oilier iimiuuil records mini iiilniTiwtioii cxisi iiccausc 
their official retention pc licies and Administrative Rules require them to retain those, 
including the true and complete copies of Mr. Miller's Investigation Reports (Addendum B, 
R. 221 & 222), that they have not produced those, that they have violated the GRAMA, the 
applicable laws, ilic iduidon policies, *11111 (in/ Admiiiistradu' Knlos, .JIIIII ilial iiiniiiiifcst 
inj usti ce and /oi ineqi lit) " have resulted. The court stated: ff [Appellees] have complied with .• 
GRAMA, [and] have acted appropriately under the law." (Addendum A, R 444) Therefore, 
Tjr1
 n argues that, based on his foregoing arguments and e* nh. M*.C, l u court's ruling is 
incorrect ni nioiicoir., Ilial iiiiimlest 
abused its discretion. Childs, Case No. 971258-CA. 
(d). Khan sent his written GR AMA request to DPS on August 29, 2005, pursuant to Utah 
Code §63-2-204(1). (Addendum B, K. 299). ors tailed i. ;esp ,_, „. HK> ^KAWIA 
requesl Jiciicc Jvliiciii iiiiiHijrs, illliji - • • " • , - ^ ^ " "V ;. 
Before Khan filed the Petition to the court on December 6, 2005 (R. . i
 v , Appellees did not 
provide him any records in response to his GRAMA request and his GRAMA appeals 
(Addendum l\ II" I I I"1 11 I lul altni lie lilnill (IK; I'clitioii, atiit/iiiie« 1 I'etilion, .mil ilisi <>MT\ 
request, Appellees produced some material, responsive records and information, including 
Investigation Reports, as shown above, that satisfied his GRAMA w viuesh and that existnl 
at the time of his GRAMA request, August 29, 2005 (Addendum B, R. 299). Appellees 
para. 7); Khan argues that they also did not produce other material records and information 
they have, or should have, because they are required to retain those pursuant to their 
agencies1 official retention policies and Administrative Rules (Addendum C). Based upon 
all of the evidence, Khan argues that before he filed the Petition on December 6, 2005, (R. 
1-11), Appellees did not provide him any of the existing records, Investigation Reports, and 
information that satisfied his GRAMA request (Addendum B, R. 299). Hence, he argues 
that before he filed the Petition to the court on December 6, 2005, Appellees did not comply 
with the GRAMA, that they violated the applicable laws, his constitutional right (Utah Code 
§63-2-102(l)(a)), his legal rights (Utah Code §63-2-102(3)(a) and §63-2-201(1)), 
Administrative Rules and their official retention policies (Addendum C), and that manifest 
injustice and/or inequity resulted; in his amended Petition, he stated that Appellees violated 
his constitutional right and his statutory right as his injuries (R. 42), and that they violated 
the GRAMA (R. 39). But the district court ruled that "[Appellees] have complied with 
GRAMA, [and] have acted appropriately under the law," and granted them summary 
judgment (Addendum A, R. 444). Khan argues that the court's conclusions and/or rulings 
fall outside the bounds of reason under the applicable laws and the relevant facts and 
evidence. Therefore, he argues that the court's findings and/or conclusions that Appellees1 
actions were in compliance with the GRAMA and appropriate under the law (and 
substantially justified) when the Appellees1 actions were based on violations of Utah Codes, 
of the Legislative Act (the GRAMA), of Khan's constitutional right, of his legal rights, and 
of their agencies1 own official retention policies or regulations and Administrative Rules, 
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constitute an abuse of discretion. (See Mendenhall v. Nauoniu • .wu, , - >,i* 
. il(l,lt I i " M ii I if also atgties nli.jl 'In ii i iilii n J I ilr lOliiui Uvnuso its • 
"error a-1 substantial and prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its 
absence, there would have been a more favorable result for" Kuan. (~ -u Pritchett, 2003 
UT 24, P 10). "[The trial comfs] judgment will not be disturbs a; ligntly, Lai ai an unless the 
c idnn/t" dearly preponderates against its iiii(linyls, n there has been .t pliiin abitsa of" '. • .• 
discretion or a manifest injustice or inequity is wrought." Richardson v. Richardson, 2007 
UT App. 222. Also, see CMMst Case No. 971258-CA; Oliekan, 2006 UT App. 405, above. 
f-N The district court's grant of summary judgment was premaiure oecause Khan had not 
icuments on . 
Appellees (R. 168-172); he argues that Appellees had produced some of the material and 
responsive records, and that their response had been incomplete. He had then filed a motion 
to compel discovery (U, 1 .'> I I '.!), la: argues dial ia icsptjiise, "Ippellaes had piodum! some 
mi in >••«" ! responsive records and Investigation Reports. As Khan has shown above, 
Appellees did not produce other existing, material and responsive records and information, 
including Mr. Miller's complete Investigation Reports (Addendum,. B, R. 221 & 222). 
"Iwasiv* oi mi'omplelr HISVUIS art" considered lo hr lailinvs In taspoiid" I \iun\n v i i/tm i\ 
16 R3d 540, 548 (Utah 2000)). Khan had also filed a Rule 56(f) motion for a stay or 
continuance (R. . ?"-" 30, 1784 83). Hence, he was diligent in using the available 
procedures to obtain discovery; because, "\< ithout adequate disco\ er> i espouses, lie was ". • 
aiiablli lo ilnlh, suppoil Ins rLimi1. in his IVlitum '\s lie has argued and shown above, 
Appellees have not produced many of the existing, material and responsive records. Hence, 
discovery was not complete, the court erred by denying his motion to compel (Addendum A, 
R. 264), and the court erred by granting summary judgment. "Generally, summary judgment 
should not be granted if discovery is incomplete since information sought in discovery may 
create genuine issues of material fact sufficient to defeat the motion" Callioux v. Progressive 
Ins. Co., 745 R2d 838, 840 (Utah 1987). "Trial courts have substantial discretion in 
deciding whether to grant continuances, and their decision will not be overturned unless that 
discretion has been clearly abused.... Nevertheless, an abuse of discretion maybe found if 
a party has made timely objections, [has] given necessary notice" through his motion to 
compel discovery {Brown, 16 R3d at 548-549). Therefore, Khan argues that the court 
abused its discretion because its "error is substantial and prejudicial such that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result for" 
him. (Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, P 10). 
(5). In its Order, the court wrote: 
[0]n November 7, 2005 the Executive Secretary of the Committee responded and 
informed [Khan] the [DPSfs] claim no records existed did not constitute a denial 
upon which she could schedule a hearing pursuant to Administrative Rule R35-2-
2(b). This rule requires a party appealing a denial to "provide sufficient evidence in 
the petitioner's statement of facts, reasons, and legal authority in support of the 
appeal, that the record did exist at one time, or that the governmental entity has 
concealed, or not sufficiently or improperly searched for the record." 
(Addendum A, R. 442). On November 7, 2005, Administrative Rule R35-2-2(b) stated: 
The claim that a record does not exist does not constitute a denial unless the 
petitioner can provide sufficient evidence in his or her statement of facts, reasons, 
and legal authority in support of appeal that record did exist at one time. A 
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determination that sutliciun tacts have or have not been alleged shall be made by 
the chair of the Committee, In the circumstance that sufficient facts have not been 
alleged, the Executive Secretary shall be instructed not to schedule an appeal 
hearing, and shall inform the petitioner appropriately. 
(Addendum C, R. 9). Khan argues that the court misquoted the Administrative Rule R35-2-
2(b) and the Records Committee's order (R. 8), and that it misunderstood or misapplied the 
Rule R35-2-2(b) and the o \ .• . ; 
-.-mfest injustice or inequity has resulted. "We will disturb the 
trial court's [decision] only if there is a misunderstanding or misapplication of the la^ 
that a manifest injustice or inequity results, indicating an abuse of discretion." utick^u, 
I i T t|i|i ln.'i if hikh i ii'-i nn wM'/SSu ;\ i hmi our i\ hum itjHir; limi ibr romi '.. • .' 
i nHiiiiiinllnl ,111 abuse of discretion, and an irregularity in its Order. / 
(6). On December 13, 2006, Khan filed a Motion for Imposition of Costs pursuant to Utah 
R, Civ. R 4(f)(4), and the court did not give its order on this J\ lotion (R. 23 7-240). Hence, . •  
i-rning this Motion by 
which he was prevented from having a fair trial, that manifest injustice and/or inequity has 
resulted, and that the court: committed an abuse of discretion. Chilth, i 'ase No. !// l2,:>8-t A. 
| I In his amended I'diIn»ii llkllkum li-u) .iko ivqiuvslcd ivimhnmniK'nl I'm tin1 nuN In* 
imii"! in in i I in this case, imposing of compensator- -images and/or civ il penalties, imposing of 
punitive damages upon Appellee-officials, and such other and further relief as is appropriate 
(R. 42). In its Order, the court did not give its decisions on these requests foi relief. Hence, 
Khan argues ^ l < - P <<;* :Mhose requests for 
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relief by which he was prevented from having a fair trial, that manifest injustice and/or 
inequity has resulted, and that the court committed abuses of discretion. Childs, Case No. 
971258-CA. 
II 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
"We will overturn the [trial] court's findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous." 
State v Greuber, 2007 UT 50, P. 6; Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). "To challenge the sufficiency of a 
trial court's findings, an appellant must [marshal] the evidence in support of the findings and 
then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the court's findings are so lacking in support as 
to be against the clear weight of the evidence." State in Interest ofD.G., 938 P.2d 298, 301 
(Utah App. 1997). "A finding of fact will be found clearly erroneous when it is contrary to 
the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court has a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been made " Arnason v. Arnason, 2002 UT App. 243. "[The trial court's] 
judgment will not be disturbed lightly, nor at all unless the evidence clearly preponderates 
against its findings, or there has been a plain abuse of discretion, or a manifest injustice or 
inequity is wrought." Richardson, 2007 UT App. 222. "For a reviewing court to find clear 
error, it must decide that the factual findings made by the trial court are not adequately 
supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the trial court's determination." Greuber, 2007 UT 50, P. 6. 
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District Court's "Undisputed Material Facts" 
Khan argues that the court's "Undisputed Material Facts" (Addendum A, R. 441-442) are 
its findings of fact. The court based its Order upon those because it wrote: "the undisputed 
material facts undisputedly demonstrate defendants conformed with the requirements 
imposed upon them under the applicable portions of GRAMA" (Id., R. 442). In its Order, 
the court's findings are: 
(1) "On December 6, 2005 plaintiff then petitioned this Court for judicial review of the 
Commissioner's response" (Id., R. 442). This finding is supported by Appellees' statement: 
"On December 6, 2005, plaintiff petitioned for judicial review of [DPS Commissioner] Mr. 
Flowers's response" (R. 270, para. 5; R. 84, para. 5; R. 513, page 3). Khan argues that in his 
Petition of December 6, 2005, to the court, he wrote: "Khan is filing this Petition for Judicial 
Review by this District Court of the State Records Committee's order" (R. 1; also see R. 33). 
In Khan's affidavit, too, he wrote similar statements (R. 418, paras. 35 & 36; also R. 410, 
paras. 11 & 12); Appellees, then, did "not dispute the alleged facts" of Khan (R. 429, para. 
25; also R. 423, paras. 6 & 7; R. 29, para. 1; R. 30, para. 5; R. 48, para. 3; R.70, para. 3), 
and, hence, they themselves agreed with Khan that on December 6, 2005, he filed his 
petition for judicial review by the district court of the "State Records Committee's order." 
He controverted Appellees' statement (R. 270, para. 5; R. 324-325, para. 5). Khan argues 
that the supporting "evidence, when compared to the contrary evidence, is so lacking as to 
warrant the conclusion that clear error has been committed" (Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 
P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987)). Hence, based upon the cited records and evidence, the 
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court's finding is not adequately supported by the record {Greuber, 2007 UT 50, R 6), and is 
contrary to the clear weight of the evidence {Arnason, 2002 UT App. 243). Therefore, the 
finding of fact is clearly erroneous. 
(2) The district court wrote: 
[0]n November 7, 2005 the Executive Secretary of the Committee responded and 
informed [Khan] the Department's claim no records existed did not constitute a 
denial upon which she could schedule a hearing pursuant to Administrative Rule 
R35-2-2(b). This rule requires a party appealing a denial to "provide sufficient 
evidence in the petitioner's statement of facts, reasons, and legal authority in support 
of the appeal, that the record did exist at one time, or that the governmental entity 
has concealed, or not sufficiently or improperly searched for the record." 
(Addendum A, R. 442). These findings are supported by Appellees' statements in R. 270, 
para. 4; R. 8-10; R. 429, para. 23; R. 84, para. 3; R. 85, para. 7; and "Plaintiff alleges that the 
Records Committee and Turtle 'misrepresented' certain items in the Records Committee's 
letter and an administrative rule governing hearings" (R. 91-92). Khan argues that the 
court's findings misrepresent or misquote the Records Committee's order and the 
Administrative Rule R35-2-2(b). On November 7, 2005, Rule R35-2-2(b) stated: 
The claim that a record does not exist does not constitute a denial unless the 
petitioner can provide sufficient evidence in his or her statement of facts, reasons, 
and legal authority in support of appeal that record did exist at one time. A 
determination that sufficient facts have or have not been alleged shall be made by 
the chair of the Committee. In the circumstance that sufficient facts have not been 
alleged, the Executive Secretary shall be instructed not to schedule an appeal 
hearing, and shall inform the petitioner appropriately. 
(Addendum C, R. 9; R. 418, para. 32). He controverted Appellees' statements (R. 270, para. 
4; R. 324, para. 4). Khan argues that he provided sufficient evidence in his statement of 
facts, reasons, and legal authority in support of his GRAMA appeal that showed material 
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records "did exist at one time" in the years 2002, 2003 and 2005 (R. 15-17; R. 418, para. 
33); legal counsel Wyss for DPS and Appellees did produce some records during discovery 
that "pertained to Mr. Khan" (R. 304, para. 6; R. 305, para. 10; R. 313, para. 5; R. 306-310, 
315-319; also R. 267; R. 271, para. 8; R. 425, para. 18; R. 429, para. 23). Khan has argued 
in this Brief that some of those records are material to his GRAMA request (Addendum B, 
R. 299), and that those records existed at the time DPS received that August 29,2005, 
GRAMA request. He argues that the court's findings contradict Rule R35-2-2(b) (which 
was in effect on November 7,2005) and the Records Committee's order (R. 8; Addendum C, 
R. 9). Hence, based upon the evidence and cited records, the court's findings about the 
Records Committee's order and the Administrative Rule R35-2-2(b) are not adequately 
supported by the record {Greuber, 2007 UT 50, R 6), and are contrary to the clear weight of 
the evidence (Arnason, 2002 UT App. 243). Therefore, the findings are clearly erroneous. 
(3) "On October 3, 2005 the Commissioner of Public Safety responded to plaintiffs request 
stating, '[n]o evidence was found to support your claims and no formal investigations was 
conducted . . . the Department of Public Safety does not have any records that satisfy your 
GRAMA request. Therefore this is a denial of your [GRAMA]... appeal'" (Addendum A, 
R. 441). These findings are supported by Appellees' statements in Addendum B, R. 11; R. 
267; R. 270, para. 3; R. 273; R. 274; R. 275; R. 304, para. 5; R. 313, para. 3; R. 433-434; R. 
83-84, para. 2; R. 87-88, 89-91. Khan argues that in his Petition to the court, he wrote: "On 
October 3, 2005, [CAO], Mr. Robert Flowers, denied [Khan's] GRAMA appeal." (R. 35; R. 
416, para. 26). He argues that the Commissioner, as the CAO of DPS, responded to Khan's 
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GRAMA "appeal" (R. 301), and not to his "request;'1 also, the CAO's response is clearly 
titled: "Re: Government Records Access and Management Act Appeal" (Addendum B, R. 
11). He controverted or disputed Appellees' statements (R. 15-17; R. 35-37; R. 323-324, 
para. 3; R. 325-326, para. 8; R. 328-330; R. 331-335). Khan complained to DPS about the 
crimes and terrorism against him and about the illegal actions of Ogden Police (Addendum 
B, R. 373). DPS confirmed that Ogden Police did not seem to "follow-up on the numbers 
and people that Mr. Khan had identified" as alleged perpetrators concerning those crimes 
and terrorism against him (R. 370; Addendum B, R. 373); DPS confirmed that it was taking 
"possible criminal actions" concerning Khan's complaint of "terroristic threats" against him 
(Addendum B, R. 221 & 222). Hence, these show DPS found evidence that supported 
Khan's claims against the Police and his claims of terrorism against him. Khan argues he 
has evidence to support his complaints (Addendum B, R. 373), although Mr. Keyser did not 
look at all of the evidence when he met with Khan, and Appellees did not produce Mr. 
Keyser's notes of that meeting; Khan sent facts about his complaints to DPS Agent Miller, 
but DPS did not produce those. During discovery, DPS produced its Investigation Reports 
(Addendum B, R. 221 and 222; R. 369-372, 373-374). Khan argues these Investigation 
Reports clearly show that DPS conducted official and formal or informal investigations of 
his complaints to DPS (Addendum B, R. 373), and that DPS also conducted a thorough 
investigation "of him (R. 369-370; R. 371; R. 374; R. 329-330); he had not requested an 
investigation "of him. DPS produced some material records and information during 
discovery that satisfied Khan's GRAMA request and that existed at the time (August 29, 
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2005) he sent his GRAMA request (Addendum B, R. 299), because those records are dated 
from November 8,2002 (R. 373) to before August 29,2005. (Addendum B, R. 221 & 222; 
R. 262, 376-378, 387, 389, 369-374; R. 148-149, DPS/SRC 1-13; R. 309-310, DPS/SRC 
204-212,214-226). Mr. Wyss, legal counsel for DPS, and Ms. Turtle produced some 
material records during discovery that "pertained to Mr. Khan" in this GRAMA case of 
Khan; those records existed at the time DPS received that GRAMA request, as shown 
above. (R. 304, para. 6; R. 305, para. 10; R. 313, para. 5). Khan argues that based on the 
foregoing, the DPS Commissioner erred by denying his GRAMA appeal. He argues that the 
supporting "evidence, when compared to the contrary evidence, is so lacking as to warrant 
the conclusion that clear error has been committed" {Newmeyer, 745 P.2d at 1278). Hence, 
based upon the cited records and evidence, the court's findings are not adequately supported 
by the record {Greuber, 2007 UT 50, P. 6), and are contrary to the clear weight of the 
evidence {Arnason, 2002 UT App. 243). Therefore, the findings are clearly erroneous. 
(4) "This action commenced with written requests plaintiff sent to the Department of Public 
Safety on August 29, 2005. In his first request plaintiff asked for 'records concerning my 
complaints to the Utah Department of Public Safety and to the Utah Homeland Security 
Department. . . complaints of terrorism and crimes against me, and about the illegal actions 
of the Ogden City Police against me'" (Addendum A, R. 441). These findings are supported 
by Appellees' statements: "On August 29, 2005, [Khan] sent a letter to [DPS] requesting 
'records concerning [his] complaints to [DPS] and to the Utah Homeland Security 
Department.' [Khan] described the documents he was requesting as 'complaints of terrorism 
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and crimes against [him], and about the illegal actions of the Ogden City Police against 
[him]'" (R. 269-270, para. 2); and "[DPS] does not dispute that Khan requested records from 
[DPS] as alleged in paragraph 18. The request speaks for itself, and, therefore, [DPS] 
disputes Khan's characterization of that letter to the extent it differs from the actual 
document. [Appellees] dispute the alleged facts in paragraph 19. Khan has made several 
requests from [DPS]" (R. 427-428, para. 14 & 15). Khan argues that in his Petition to the 
court, he wrote: "On August 29, 2005, . . . [Khan] filed a [GRAMA] request to [DPS] for 
records of [DPS officials] regarding [his] complaints or claims to [DPS]." (R. 35). He 
argues that he sent only one written GRAMA request titled "Government Records Access 
and Management Act Request" dated August 29,2005, addressed to DPS (see Addendum B, 
R. 299), that he did not send any other written GRAMA request addressed to DPS or to Utah 
Homeland Security Department (R. 415, para. 19), and that he did not make "several 
requests" from DPS. In his affidavit, he wrote: "On August 29, 2005, . . . I filed a 
[GRAMA] request to [DPS] for records relevant to my complaints to [DPS]..." (R. 415, 
para. 18). Khan controverted Appellees1 statements (R. 269-270, para. 2; R. 322-323, para. 
2). (The court's Order repeatedly states or implies that Khan sent "requests," i.e., more than 
one GRAMA request to DPS (Addendum A, R. 441, 443 & 444)). He argues that the 
supporting "evidence, when compared to the contrary evidence, is so lacking as to warrant 
the conclusion that clear error has been committed" (Newmeyer, 745 P.2d at 1278). Hence, 
based upon the cited records and evidence, the court's findings of "requests [Khan] sent to 
[DPS] on August 29, 2005," and his "first" request are not adequately supported by the 
32 
record (Greuber, 2007 UT 50, R 6), and are contrary to the clear weight of the evidence 
(Arnason, 2002 UT App. 243). Therefore, the findings are clearly erroneous. 
(5) "In his second request then to the 'Chief Administrative Officer' of the Department of 
Public Safety on September 19, 2005, plaintiff stated that because the Department of Public 
Safety had not responded to his prior request within ten days, he was 'filing this appeal to 
you concerning the 'denial' of my Government Records Access and Management Act 
request, pursuant to Utah Code §63-2-205'" (Addendum A, R. 441). These findings are 
supported by Appellees' statements: "[Khan] sent the same request again on September 19, 
2005" (R. 270, para. 2); "Khan wrote again to the [CAO] of [DPS] on September 19,2005" 
(R. 432); and "[CAO] wrote that Khan's request was a repeat" (R. 433; Addendum B, R. 11). 
Khan argues that in his Petition to the court, he wrote: "On September 19,2005, [Khan] then 
timely filed the GRAMA appeal to the Chief Administrative Officer of [DPS], pursuant to 
Utah Code §63-2-401." (R. 35). He argues that he did not file or send "his second request" 
or a "second" GRAMA request to the CAO of DPS "on September 19,2005." On 
September 19, 2005, he sent or filed his GRAMA "appeal" to the CAO of DPS, pursuant to 
Section 63-2-401, and he enclosed a copy of his August 29, 2005, GRAMA request, as his 
GRAMA appeal states; that appeal of his is clearly titled: "Re: Government Records Access 
and Management Act Appeal" (R. 301). In his affidavit, Khan wrote: "On September 19, 
2005,1, then, timely filed the GRAMA appeal to the [CAO] of [DPS].. . appealing the 
denial of my GRAMA request." (R. 415, para. 25); Appellees did "not dispute the alleged 
facts [of Khan] in paragraph 25" (R. 428, para. 18), and, hence, they themselves agreed with 
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Khan that he sent his GRAMA "appeal" to the CAO on September 19,2005. Khan 
controverted Appellees1 statement (R. 270, para. 2; R. 322-323, para. 2). He argues that he 
did not write "prior" request (or "first" request) in that GRAMA appeal. He argues that the 
supporting "evidence, when compared to the contrary evidence, is so lacking as to warrant 
the conclusion that clear error has been committed" (Newmeyer, 745 P.2d at 1278). Hence, 
based upon the cited records and evidence, the court's findings of "second request" and 
"prior request" are not adequately supported by the record (Greuber, 2007 UT 50, P. 6), and 
are contrary to the clear weight of the evidence (Arnason, 2002 UT App. 243). Therefore, 
the findings are clearly erroneous. 
Hence, based on the foregoing, Khan has demonstrated that the court's "Undisputed 
Material Facts" are clearly erroneous. Also, he argues that the court misrepresented the 
court records in this case and the Administrative Rule R35-2-2(b) (Addendum C, R. 9). 
District Court's Findings of Fact 
Khan argues that some of the court's "findings are not sufficiently detailed to disclose the 
evidentiary basis for the court's decision and thereby allow for meaningful review" 
(Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 638 (Utah App. 1995)). He will attempt to show that 
the findings of fact are clearly erroneous. In its Order, the court's findings of fact are: 
(i) "Plaintiff claims defendants have produced no records in response to his GRAMA 
request, but defendants have supported their claims that they have no such records" 
(Addendum A, R. 442-443), "defendants have consistently supported their denials of these 
requests with supported claim that no records exist" (Id., R. 443), and "[Khan] has not 
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shown defendants did anything other than all they could under his unduly burdensome litany 
of correspondences to them" (Id.). These findings are supported by statements in R, 8; 
Addendum B, R. 11; R. 3, 6, 35, 38, 39, 40,41, 42; R. 83-84; R. 131,134,135,137; R. 142, 
response to para. 9; R. 144, response to para. 15; R. 186, 187-188; R. 202-203, para, h; R. 
212,213,215-216,217,219; R. 255, 256, 257; R. 267; R. 270, paras. 3,4; R. 271, paras. 7, 
8; R. 273; R. 274; R. 275; R. 411, paras. 28, 30; R. 415, para. 24; R. 416, para. 26; R. 417, 
para. 29; R. 418, para. 31; R. 428, para. 19, 20; R. 429, para. 21; R. 432,433,434; R. 409, 
paras. 3, 6, 9; R. 423, paras. 3 & 4; R. 304, paras. 4, 5, 7, 8; R. 313, para. 3,7; R. 323,324, 
328, 329, 330, 331-332, 333, 335. Khan argues that the material facts are: (1) On November 
8, 2002, Khan sent Utah Homeland Security Department (in DPS) his complaints about the 
continuing crimes and terrorism against him by some people since 1994, and about the 
illegal actions of the Ogden City Police concerning his complaint to them of those crimes 
and terrorism (Addendum B, R. 373); (2) In 2002, 2003 and 2005, he corresponded by 
emails, fax, and telephone with DPS investigators and officers about his complaints; (3) On 
August 29, 2005, he sent a GRAMA request to DPS requesting records relevant to his 
November 8, 2002, complaints to DPS (Addendum B, R. 299 & 373); (4) DPS did not 
respond to his GRAMA request; (5) After he sent his GRAMA appeal to the DPS CAO, the 
CAO wrote: "No evidence was found to support your claims and no formal investigation 
was conducted.... [DPS] does not have any records that satisfy your GRAMA request," and 
did not provide him any records or information (R. 301; Addendum B, R. 11); (6) After 
Khan sent his GRAMA appeal to the Records Committee, the Committee wrote: "According 
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to Administrative Rule R35-2-2(b), the claim that a record does not exist does not constitute a 
denial. Sufficient facts have not been alleged to determine that the records do exist and 
therefore I cannot schedule a hearing," and did not provide him any records or information 
(R. 15-18; R. 8-10); (7) On December 6, 2005, he filed his Petition for judicial review by the 
court of the State Records Committee's order (R. 1-11; also R. 33-43); and (8) During 
discovery (R. 168-172; R. 131-172), Appellees produced records identified in their Indexes 
(R. 306-309, DPS/SRC 1-202; R. 309-310, DPS/SRC 203-226). Khan argues that some of 
the records and information Appellees produced are material and responsive to his GRAMA 
request and that those existed at the time he sent his August 29,2005 GRAMA request 
(Addendum B, R. 299), because those are dated November 8, 2002 to before August 29, 
2005, those pertain to his complaints to DPS (Addendum B, R. 373), and Mr. Wyss wrote 
that those "pertained to Mr. Khan" "in this [GRAMA] case" (R. 304, para. 6; also R. 313, 
paras. 5, 6). (See Addendum B, R. 221 & 222; R. 262, 376-378, 387, 389, 369-374; R. 148-
149, DPS/SRC 1-13; R. 309-310, DPS/SRC 204-212, 214-226). Appellees, too, wrote that 
they "have produced records they can locate that pertain to Mr. Khan" (R. 275; R. 434; R. 
271, para. 8). Hence, these records show that Appellees did have "such records" and the 
"records [did] exist." He argues that in response to his GRAMA request and his GRAMA 
appeals to the DPS CAO and the Records Committee (Addendum B, R. 299; R. 301 & 15-
18), i.e., before he filed his Petition to the court (R. 1-11), Appellees provided him no 
records at all (see Addendum B, R. 11; R. 8-10; R. 415, para. 24; R. 320-321; R. 325, para. 
7), even though material records and information existed on August 29, 2005, as shown 
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above. Based on the above, he argues that the Appellees' claims—"they have no such 
records" and "no records exist"—are invalid, false and misleading, and that they have not 
supported their claims; also, the material records they produced during discovery prove their 
official responses (Addendum B, R. 11; R. 8) to be false and misleading. The court did not 
provide sufficient details on "such records" and "these requests" (and "extraneous requests"). 
Therefore, based on the evidence and the cited records, the court's first and second findings, 
above, are not adequately supported by the record, and are contrary to the clear weight of the 
evidence. Khan has argued earlier in this Brief that Appellees did not provide him and 
produce: (a) the true and complete copies of the material, responsive, and existing, official 
Investigation Reports of Mr. Miller, the existing "synopsis," the existing "letter," the existing 
cover sheet, and the existing information (Addendum B, R. 221 & 222); (b) other existing, 
responsive, and material, official records and information that they are required to retain in 
accordance with their agencies' official retention policies and Administrative Rules 
(Addendum C; R. 513, pages 7-8,9); (c) "the recording of the minutes of the Records 
Committee's meetings" on his GRAMA appeal (R. 313, para. 4); (d) the existing, material, 
responsive records, other than the non-privileged records (R. 305, para. 10; R. 313 para. 6); 
and (e) copies of the correspondences between him and the DPS investigators and officers 
pertaining to his November 8, 2002, complaints to DPS that they are required to retain 
pursuant to their retention policies, e.g., R. 379-382. (R. 2-3, 4, 5; R. 34-35,36,37; R. 417, 
para. 29; R. 513, page 10). Appellees "do not dispute that Khan addressed letters and 
electronic mail to employees of [DPS] and the Utah Division of Homeland Security in 2002 
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and 2003" regarding his November 8, 2002, complaints (R. 414, para. 4; R. 426, para. 4; R. 
409, paras. 1 & 2; R. 422, paras. 1 & 2); they admit Mr. Keith of DPS "communicated with 
an Ogden Police official regarding [Khan's] complaint to DPS" (R. 411, para. 22; R. 380; R. 
424, para. 14). But they did not provide Khan, and produce, all of those records and 
information that are material to his complaints to DPS and to his GRAMA request 
(Addendum B, R. 373 and 299), and that existed on August 29, 2005. On February, 4, 2005, 
Mr. McKee wrote that DPS "looked into [Khan's] complaints on various occasions" (R. 
262); Khan argues this indicates that there exist several material DPS information and 
records that Appellees have not produced (R. 256, para. 2). Khan has argued that, in 
response to his GRAMA request and GRAMA appeal, i.e., before he filed his Petition, DPS 
did not provide him any of the existing, material, responsive records and information, 
identified above, that they (and Mr. Wyss) later produced during discovery. The Records 
Committee failed to order DPS to provide Khan those material, responsive records and 
information DPS had at that time (see Utah Code §63-2-403(10), and (12)(b)). Hence, Khan 
argues that based on the above evidence and the cited records, Appellees did not do "all they 
could" have in response to his GRAMA request, his GRAMA appeals, and during legitimate 
discovery; only after he filed the motion to compel (R. 131-172), Appellees produced some 
more material records, e.g., the Investigation Reports (Addendum B, R. 221 & 222; R. 369-
374). Therefore, based on the evidence and the cited records, the court's third finding, 
above, is not adequately supported by the record, and is contrary to the clear weight of the 
evidence. Based on the foregoing, Khan argues that Appellees did not support their claims. 
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The court's findings contain the words "such records," "these requests," and "his unduly 
burdensome litany of correspondences to them;" these are vague words, and are fnot 
sufficiently detailed to disclose the evidentiary basis for' these words; the court has 'not 
included enough subsidiary facts' (see Campbell, 896 R2d at 638-639). He argues that the 
supporting "evidence, when compared to the contrary evidence, is so lacking as to warrant 
the conclusion that clear error has been committed" (Newmeyer, 745 P.2d at 1278). Hence, 
based upon the cited records and evidence, the court's findings are not adequately supported 
by the record (Greuber, 2007 UT 50, R 6), and are contrary to the clear weight of the 
evidence (Arnason, 2002 UT App. 243). Therefore, the findings are clearly erroneous, 
(ii) "Defendants submitted affidavits from the people involved in attempting to locate these 
records, and detailed outlines of the procedures followed in this effort" (Addendum A, R. 
443). These findings are supported by Appellees' statements: "During the course of 
discovery, [DPS] and Records Committee searched their records and provided [Khan] 
documents they could locate that pertained to Mr. Khan. Affidavit of Rick Wyss at 6 & 7 . . . 
; Affidavit of Janell Turtle at 5 & 6" (R. 271, para. 8); "throughout discovery, defendants 
have produced records they can locate that pertain to Mr. Khan. See Wyss Affidavit at 10; 
Turtle Affidavit at 6" (R. 275; R. 423, para. 8; R. 429, para. 26); (R. 303-319); andR. 513, 
pages 8-9. Wyss and Turtle wrote that they, in the course of discovery in this case, made a 
diligent search of their records and produced the documents listed on their index that 
pertained to Khan in this GRAMA case of his (R. 304, paras. 6 & 7; R. 313, para. 5); Khan 
has shown, above, that some of the records they produced during discovery satisfied his 
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GRAMA request and existed at the time DPS received his GRAMA request (Addendum B, 
R. 299). Khan argues that they did not make a diligent search of their records after he sent 
their agencies his GRAMA appeals, because they did not provide him any records with their 
official responses (Addendum B, R. 11; R. 8) to his GRAMA request and his GRAMA 
appeals (Addendum B, R. 299; R. 301 & 15-18); and that, hence, Wyss and Turtle violated 
the GRAMA, the applicable laws and procedures, his constitutional right (Utah Code §63-2-
102(l)(a)), and his legal right (Utah Code §63-2-102(3)(a) and §63-2-201(1)) before he 
filed his Petition to the court (R. 1-11). He argues Wyss and Turtle have not produced other 
material records and information that their agencies are required to retain in accordance with 
their agencies' official retention policies and Administrative Rules (Addendum C), and that 
the agencies have or should have. They also did not produce the true and complete copies of 
Mr. Miller's Investigation Reports (Addendum B, R. 221 & R. 222), "the recording of the 
minutes of the Records Committee's meetings" on Khan's GRAMA appeal (R. 313, para. 4; 
R. 15-18), and records, other than the non-privileged records (R. 305, para. 10; R. 313, para. 
6). Khan controverted Appellees' statements (R. 325-326, para. 8; R. 333-334; R. 460,461, 
462). He argues that Wyss deliberately concealed Khan's complaint of "the illegal actions of 
Ogden City Police" from his sworn affidavit (Addendum B, R. 299 & 373; R. 304, para. 5). 
He argues that all of the above evidence and facts show that Wyss's and Turtle's official 
responses (Addendum B, R. 11; R. 8) clearly contradict their statements in their sworn 
affidavits (Wyss wrote: "I reviewed and drafted the response signed by [the DPS CAO] 
dated October 3, 2005" (Addendum B, R. 11)) (R. 304-305, paras. 3-8, 10; R. 313-314, 
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paras. 3, 5, 6, 7). Based on the above, he argues that their sworn affidavits are misleading, 
inaccurate, and invalid. Hence, Khan argues that all of the foregoing evidence indicate the 
invalidity, insufficiency, and/or inaccuracy of Mr. Wyssfs and Ms. Turtle's statements in their 
sworn affidavits (Id.), of their attempt to locate the material records, and of their search 
procedures. He argues that the supporting "evidence, when compared to the contrary 
evidence, is so lacking as to warrant the conclusion that clear error has been committed" 
(Newmeyer, 745 P.2d at 1278). Based upon the cited records and evidence, the court's 
findings are not adequately supported by the record (Greuber, 2007 UT 50, P. 6), and are 
contrary to the clear weight of the evidence (Arnason, 2002 UT App. 243). Therefore, the 
findings are clearly erroneous. 
(iii) "The material facts of this case are those pertaining to plaintiffs GRAMA requests and 
the department's response to his requests" (Addendum A, R. 443). Khan has argued and 
shown, above, in this Brief that the court's findings "requests," "first request," "second 
request," "prior request" with respect to his GRAMA request (Addendum B, R. 299) and 
GRAMA appeal (R. 301) are clearly erroneous; using the same supporting evidence that he 
marshaled for those findings, above, to now support the findings "GRAMA requests" and 
"his requests," he similarly argues that these findings, too, are not adequately supported by 
the record. The finding about "the department's response" is supported by Appellees' 
statement: "On December 6, 2005, plaintiff petitioned for judicial review of [DPS 
Commissioner] Mr. Flowers response" (R. 270, para. 5; R. 84, para. 5; R. 513, page 3; 
Addendum A, R. 442); Khan controverted Appellees' statement (R. 324-325, para. 5). He 
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argues that the court's finding is based on its judicial review of the wrong response, i.e., of 
"the department's response" (Addendum B, R. 11), instead of the Records Committee's order 
(Addendum A, R. 442). He filed his petition for judicial review by the court of "the State 
Records Committee's order" (R. 1 & 33). In his affidavit, too, he wrote similar statements 
(R. 418, paras. 35 & 36); Appellees did "not dispute the alleged facts" of Khan (R. 429, 
para. 25; also R. 29, para. 1; R. 30, para. 5; R. 48, para. 3; R.70, para. 3), and, hence, they 
themselves agreed with Khan that on December 6,2005, he filed his petition for judicial 
review by the court of the "State Records Committee's order." Khan argues that the material 
facts of this case are those pertaining to his one and only one GRAMA request to DPS 
(Addendum B, R. 299), and the Records Committee's order (R. 8-10) on his GRAMA 
appeal (R. 15-18). He argues that the supporting "evidence, when compared to the contrary 
evidence, is so lacking as to warrant the conclusion that clear error has been committed" 
(Newmeyer, 745 P.2d at 1278). Hence, based upon the cited records and evidence, the 
court's findings are not adequately supported by the record (Greuber, 2007 UT 50, P. 6), and 
are contrary to the clear weight of the evidence (Arnason, 2002 UT App. 243). Therefore, 
the findings of fact are clearly erroneous. 
(iv) "The documents introduced as evidence to this Court demonstrate defendants' response 
has met GRAMA's requirements" (Addendum A, R. 443); "defendants responded to his 
requests in compliance with GRAMA" (Id.); "Plaintiffs differing opinions of the facts do 
not persuade the Court that there truly remains any actual dispute of any material fact in this 
case" (Id.); "the undisputed material facts undisputedly demonstrate defendants conformed 
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with the requirements imposed upon them under the applicable portions of GRAMA" (Id., 
R. 442); and "The court finds defendants have complied with the applicable laws and 
procedures of GRAMA and have given [Khan] information to which he was entitled in 
response to his requests. Defendants have complied with GRAMA, have acted 
appropriately under the law." (Id., R. 444). These findings are supported by documents and 
statements in Addendum B, R. 221, 222, 299; Addendum A, R. 264; R. 255,256,257,260, 
262,267, 269-270, 271, 272,273, 274,275,276, 278-297, 301, 303-310,312-319,369-374, 
376-378, 384, 385, 387, 389, 396-407, 148-167; Addendum C, Administrative Rules and 
retention policies; R. 422, paras. 1, 2; R. 423-424, paras. 3, 8, 11-14; R. 425, paras. 18,20; 
R. 426, paras 6-8; R. 427, paras. 9-13; R. 428, paras. 15, 17; R. 429, paras. 23,26,28; R. 
430, paras. 29, 30, 33, 34; R. 431, para. 35; R. 431-434; R. 185,186,187-188,189-190,195, 
212, 225, 226-228,229, 140-146, 83-84, 89-91; Addendum A, R. 264, para. 3; R. 513, pages 
3-4, 7-9, 10. Here, Khan uses his arguments he presented in paragraph (i), above. He has 
shown that in response to his GRAMA request and his GRAMA appeals to the DPS CAO 
and the Records Committee (Addendum B, R. 299; R. 301, 15-18), i.e., before he filed his 
Petition to the court (R. 1-11), Appellees did not provide him any records at all, even though 
they had some of the material and responsive information, records, and Investigation 
Reports (that they later produced during discovery) at the time he sent his August 29,2005 
GRAMA request (Addendum B, R. 299). But after he filed the petition and during 
discovery, Appellees produced some material records and information, including 
Investigation Reports, that satisfied his GRAMA request, and that existed at the time he sent 
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his GRAMA request, as shown above. Hence, Khan argues that Appellees violated the 
GRAMA before he filed the petition. The DPS CAO, for DPS, wrote: "[DPS] does not have 
any records that satisfy your GRAMA request" (Addendum B, R. 11), when, in fact, DPS 
had material records and information at that time that DPS later produced; hence, he wrote a 
false statement with regards to the GRAMA, and he acted inappropriately under the law. 
The Records Committee misrepresented the Administrative Rule R35-2-2(b) with regards to 
the GRAMA (R. 8; Addendum C, R. 9), and, hence, acted inappropriately under the law. 
The records show that Appellees produced incomplete and untrue copies of Miller's 
Investigation Reports, and concealed the material information that is in those Reports 
(Addendum B, R. 221 & 222); even after Khan mentioned that those Reports were 
incomplete, they failed to produce the true and complete copies of those two Investigation 
Reports (R. 410, para. 21; R. 424, para. 14). Hence, they violated the GRAMA and the 
applicable laws. Appellees wrote that they did not have any other records that pertain to 
Khan (R. 305, para. 8; R. 314, para. 7), but Khan argues that they also did not produce other 
material records and information that they have, or should have, because they are required to 
retain those pursuant to their agencies1 official retention policies and Administrative Rules 
(Addendum C), e.g., copies of the correspondences between him and the DPS investigators 
and officers pertaining to his complaints to DPS (Addendum B, R. 373), communication of 
Mr. Keith with an Ogden Police official regarding Khan's complaint to DPS (R. 422, paras. 
1,2; R. 424, para. 14; R. 426, para. 4). Hence, they violated the GRAMA. In its order (R. 
8), the Records Committee failed to order DPS to provide Khan the material, responsive 
44 
records and information that DPS had at that time as shown above (Utah Code §63-2-
403(10), and (12)(b)); hence, it did not comply with the applicable law and procedure of 
GRAMA. Khan had sent his written GRAMA request to DPS pursuant to Utah Code §63-
2-204(1), but DPS failed to respond to his GRAMA request; hence, Khan argues that DPS 
clearly violated the GRAMA procedures of §63-2-204(3)(a) and §63-2-205. Above in this 
Brief, Khan demonstrated that the court's "undisputed material facts1' are clearly erroneous, 
and that the court misrepresented the court records in this case and the Administrative Rule 
R35-2-2(b) (Addendum C, R. 9); hence, the court's undisputed material facts and the facts 
Khan presented here do not demonstrate Appellees conformed with the requirements 
imposed upon them under the applicable portions of GRAMA. Hence, Khan argues that all 
of the foregoing evidence, facts and records show that, before and after Khan filed the 
petition to the court and during discovery, Appellees did not comply with the GRAMA, the 
applicable laws, requirements and procedures of GRAMA, that they violated his 
constitutional "right of access to information concerning the conduct of the public's 
business" (Utah Code §63-2-102(l)(a)), his legal right of access to unrestricted public 
records (Utah Code §63-2-102(3)(a) and §63-2-201(1)), and the cited Administrative Rules 
and retention policies (Addendum C), that they did not give him all of the material and 
responsive records and information he was entitled to, and that they acted inappropriately 
under the law. Khan argues that the foregoing shows that there truly remain actual and 
genuine issues or disputes as to material facts in this case. He argues that the court's 
findings contain wordings "his requests," "the facts," and "information" that are not 
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sufficiently detailed to disclose the evidentiary basis for these words; the court has not 
included enough subsidiary facts (see Campbell, 896 P.2d at 638-639). He argues that the 
supporting "evidence, when compared to the contrary evidence, is so lacking as to warrant 
the conclusion that clear error has been committed" (Newrneyer, 745 P.2d at 1278). Hence, 
based upon the cited records and evidence, the court's findings are not adequately supported 
by the record (Greuber, 2007 UT 50, P. 6), and are contrary to the clear weight of the 
evidence (Arnason, 2002 UT App. 243). Therefore, the findings are clearly erroneous, 
(v) The court's Order states: "Defendants have succinctly surveyed the federal and Utah 
case law on the public's right to access governmental information, and the Court will not 
reiterate it here" (R. 439). This finding is supported by Appellees' statements about 
particular records (R. 271-273, 275; R. 266; R. 431; R. 434). Khan argues that he did not 
request "particular" records, and that he controverted Appellees' statements (R. 327-328). 
Hence, the finding's supporting evidence is irrelevant in this case. He argues that according 
to Utah Code §63-2-103(22)(a), "information [is] in the original" record, i.e., a record 
contains information; hence, for him to access the material and responsive information, he 
has to have access to the material and responsive records, which means that Appellees 
should produce such material records to him. Pursuant to Utah Code §63-2-102(l)(a) and 
the GRAMA, Khan does have the constitutional right of access to the material and 
responsive "information concerning the conduct of the public's business." Hence, based 
upon the cited records and evidence, the court's finding about Khan's right to access 
"particular" governmental information is not adequately supported by the record {Greuber, 
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2007 UT 50, P. 6), and is contrary to the clear weight of the evidence {Arnason, 2002 UT 
App. 243). Therefore, the finding is clearly erroneous. 
(vi) "Plaintiff has made some extraneous requests throughout his appeals process" 
(Addendum A, R. 443), "Plaintiff submitted his opinions of the material facts and of 
immaterial facts" (Id.), "under [Khanfs] unduly burdensome litany of correspondences to 
them" {Id), "Plaintiff attempts to create disputes of irrelevant facts or disputes of material 
facts where there simply are none" {Id), "The documents introduced as evidence to this 
Court" (Id.), and "Plaintiffs differing opinions of the facts" {Id). Khan argues that "some 
extraneous requests," "requests," "his opinions," "the material facts," "immaterial facts," his 
"litany of correspondences," "irrelevant facts," "the documents introduced as evidence," and 
"the facts" are vague words. The court did not clearly identify or specify these items. 
Hence, Khan argues that these findings are too general or vague, making it difficult for him 
to marshal all the evidence supporting these findings and then demonstrate that these 
findings are not supported by legally sufficient evidence; these findings are "facially 
inadequate" to allow for meaningful review. {Campbell, 896 P.2d at 638.) He argues that 
these findings are not adequate because they are not sufficiently detailed and do not include 
"enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached." {Id., at 638-639). "Appellants need not engage in a futile 
[marshaling] exercise if they can demonstrate the findings, as framed by the court, are 
legally insufficient." (Id. at 638). 
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Ill 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
"If there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of fact, the doubt should be 
resolved in favor of the opposing party. Thus, the court must evaluate all the evidence and 
all reasonable inferences fairly drawn from the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
party opposing summary judgment.'1 Frisbee v. K&K Constr. Co., 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah 
1984); Goodnow v. Sullivan, 2002 UT 21, P. 17; Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). At the hearing, Khan 
informed the court: " . . . IVe not received those records" (R. 513, page 8). The court 
informed Khan: "Well, you know, I don't know whether youVe received the records or not, 
but Mr. Ferre is telling me that youVe [been] provided all the records" (Id.). Khan argues 
that this shows a doubt or uncertainty in the Judge's mind concerning question of fact about 
the production of material records. Therefore, summary judgment should be denied. 
Khan argues that he has shown, in this Brief, that the court's findings of fact and the 
court's "Undisputed Material Facts" are clearly erroneous; hence, he argues that the court's 
ensuing conclusion of granting summary judgment is erroneous. 
Khan argues that the court's Order is erroneously based on the court's judicial review of 
the DPS "Commissioner's response," as stated in the court's "Undisputed Material Facts" 
(Addendum A, R. 442), instead of being based on the judicial review of the State Records 
Committee's order or decision (R. 8-10). Utah Code §63-2-404(l)(a) clearly states: "Any 
party to a proceeding before the records committee may petition for judicial review by the 
district court of the records committee's order." Also, Khan argues that the court's Order 
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reviews and discusses the response of DPS (Addendum B, R. 11), and does not review and 
discuss the order or decision of the Records Committee (Addendum A, R. 442-444). 
Therefore, he argues that the court's ensuing conclusion of granting summary judgment is 
erroneous, because it is based on the judicial review of the wrong response by the court. 
Khan has shown, in this Brief, that the court's "Undisputed Material Facts" are clearly 
erroneous; hence, he disputes these "Undisputed Material Facts." Therefore, there are 
genuine issues as to these "Material Facts," and summary judgment should be denied. 
The court's Order states: "On December 6, 2005 plaintiff then petitioned this Court for 
judicial review of the [DPS] Commissioner's response" (Addendum A, R. 442); the court 
identified this as one of the "undisputed material facts" (Id., R. 441). Khan disputes this 
"material fact" of the court because he filed his Petition and amended Petition for judicial 
review of "the State Records Committee's order" (see R. 1 & R. 33). Hence, he argues that 
there is a genuine issue as to this "material fact," and, therefore, summary judgment should 
be denied. 
The record shows that Appellees produced untrue and incomplete copies of Miller's 
Investigation Reports, and that they concealed the material information that is in those 
Reports (Addendum B, R. 221 & 222). Khan argued that the agencies' retention policies 
and Administrative Rules require Appellees to retain official records and the recording of the 
minutes of the Records Committee's meetings on his GRAMA appeal; Appellees did not 
give him all those retained, material records and the recording. On February 4, 2005, Mr. 
McKee of DPS wrote to Khan: "Our agency has looked into your complaints on various 
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occasions " (R. 262); hence, Khan argues that this indicates that there exist several other 
material records, Investigation Reports, and/or information responsive to his complaints and 
GRAMA request that they have not produced. He did not get all of the existing records and 
information that are material to his complaints to DPS and to his GRAMA request. Hence, 
there are doubts or uncertainties concerning the question of fact as to whether Appellees 
gave Khan all of the material, responsive, and existing records and information; therefore, 
summary judgment should have been denied. Frisbee, 676 P.2d at 389. Khan has presented 
a genuine issue as to Appellees' failure to give him all of the existing, responsive, and 
material records and information. Therefore, summary judgment should have been denied. 
Khan argued that discovery was not complete, and that the court erred by denying his 
motion to compel (Addendum A, R. 264), and by granting Appellees the summary judgment 
(Addendum A, R. 444). As he has argued above, Appellees have not given him the true and 
complete copies of Miller's Investigation Reports (Addendum B, R. 221 & 222), and all of 
the other retained, material and responsive records and information. "Generally, summary 
judgment should not be granted if discovery is incomplete since information sought in 
discovery may create genuine issues of material fact sufficient to defeat the motion" 
Callioux, 745 R2d at 840. Hence, summary judgment should have been denied. 
Khan has shown, above, that in response to his GRAMA request and his GRAMA 
appeals to the DPS CAO and the Records Committee (Addendum B, R. 299; R. 301,15-18), 
i.e., before he filed his Petition to the court (R. 1-11), Appellees did not provide him any 
records at all, even though they had some of the material and responsive records and 
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information at the time he sent his August 29, 2005 GRAMA request (Addendum B, R. 
299). DPS CAO wrote: "[DPS] does not have any records that satisfy your GRAMA 
request" (Addendum B, R. 11). But after Khan filed his petition (R. 1-13 & 33-43) and 
discovery request (R. 168-172), Appellees produced some records which were material to 
his GRAMA request (R. 262, 376, 378, 387, 389; R. 148-149, DPS/SRC 1-13). He, then, 
filed a motion to compel (R. 131-167), and they produced Investigation Reports (Addendum 
B, R. 221 & 222; R. 369-374) and some more records (R. 262, 377, 378,387; R. 309-310, 
DPS/SRC 204-212, 214-226) that were material to his GRAMA request. As he has shown 
above, they have not given him other material records and information that they have, or 
should have, because they are required to retain those. He argues that Appellees1 reluctance 
to provide him and produce the material records and information, and that their misleading, 
false, official, written responses to his GRAMA appeals clearly indicate the unreliability and 
invalidity of their official responses in this case, and their failure to comply with the 
GRAMA, the applicable laws and procedures, the Administrative Rules, and their retention 
policies. But the court wrote: "Defendants have complied with GRAMA" (Addendum A, R. 
444). Hence, there are genuine issues as to these material facts; therefore, summary 
judgment should have been denied. 
Khan has argued, above, that DPSfs official response of October 3,2005 (Addendum B, 
R. 11), the Records Committee's order (R. 8-10), and Mr. Wyssfs and Ms. Turtle's sworn 
affidavits (R. 303-305; R. 312-314) contain misrepresentations, and, hence, are inaccurate, 
misleading, and invalid. Also, their response and order are in conflict with their sworn 
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affidavits with regards to existence of material records. But the court's Order states: "The 
documents introduced as evidence to this Court demonstrate defendants1 response has met 
GRAJVLAs requirements" (Addendum A, R. 443), and "Defendants have complied with 
GRAMA, have acted appropriately under the law" (Id., R. 444). Hence, there are doubts or 
uncertainties concerning the questions of fact as to the validity and accuracies of Appellees1 
responses and their affidavits, and as to Appellees1 production of all material records and 
information; therefore, summary judgment should have been denied. Frisbee, 676 R2d at 
389. Also, there are genuine issues as to these material facts, and summary judgment should 
have been denied. (Rule 56(c)). 
Because Appellees did not give Khan all of the existing, material, responsive information 
and records, as argued above, he argues that Appellees also violated his constitutional "right 
of access to information concerning the conduct of the public's business" (Utah Code §63-2-
102(l)(a)), and his legal right of access to unrestricted public records (Utah Code §63-2-
102(3)(a) and §63-2-201(1)); these statutes and laws are GRAMA-related. But the court's 
Order states: "The court finds defendants have complied with the applicable laws and 
procedures of GRAMA" (Addendum A, R. 444). Hence, there are genuine issues as to 
whether Appellees violated: (a) Khan's constitutional right of access to information 
concerning the conduct of the public's business, i.e., Cause of action, Count 2; and (b) his 
legal right of access to unrestricted public records, i.e., Cause of action, Count 1. (R. 38-39). 
Therefore, summary judgment should have been denied. 
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Khan's statement of material facts in his affidavit (R. 413-420, paras. 5-8,11,12,14,20, 
42, 45-48) are in conflict with Appellees1 statement of material facts in their affidavits (R. 
303-305, paras. 5, 7, 8, 10; R. 312-314, paras. 5, 7). "The conflicting statements in the two 
affidavits raise an issue of fact" Strand v. Prince-Covey & Co., 534 P.2d 892, 893 (Utah 
1975). If the affidavits on the one side and on the other are directly opposed as to the facts 
shown, the case must go to trial. Hence, there are genuine issues as to these material facts, 
and summary judgment should have been denied. 
Appellees and Khan have disputed each other's material facts (R. 269-271, 321-326; R. 
409-411, 422-425). Hence, there are genuine issues as to the material facts, and summary 
judgment should have been denied. 
Based upon the foregoing, Khan argues that substantial, genuine issues as to material 
facts exist, and that Appellees are not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Rule 56(c)). 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the arguments presented in this Brief, Khan requests this Court to: (1) find 
the district court's decisions were not correct because they resulted in manifest injustice or 
inequity, indicating clear abuses of discretion by the court; (2) overturn the district court's 
findings of fact because they are clearly erroneous; (3) reverse the district court's order 
granting summary judgment; (4) find the court's "Undisputed Material Facts" to be clearly 
erroneous; (5) order the discovery to continue because it is not complete; (6) reverse the 
order denying motion to compel; (7) direct the district court to issue decision on the pending 
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motion for imposition of costs, and on the reliefs sought by Khan; (8) direct the district court 
to award Khan the expenses he incurred in bringing the motion to compel. 
September 27, 2007 
Nasrulla Khan 
Pro Se Appellant 
1024 Childs Ave., #205 
Ogden, Utah 84404 
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I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of the Appellant were served on 
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postage prepaid, or hand-delivery, on September 27, 2007. 
Nasrulla Khan 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A Order denying motion to compel (R. 263-265). 
Ruling and Order granting Appellees summary judgment (R. 438-444). 
Addendum B DPS Chief Administrative Officer's response (R. 11). 
Mr. Miller's Investigation Reports (R. 221 & R. 222). 
Khan's GRAMA request (R.299). 
Khan's complaints to DPS (R. 373). 
Addendum C Utah Code §§ 63-2-102, 63-2-103, 63-2-201, 63-2-204,63-2-205,63-
2-401, 63-2-403, and 63-2-404. 
Administrative Rules R35-1-4 & R35-2-2 (R. 9-10). 
Retention Reports (Policies) labeled as Series 2266, 81804, 84406, 
84410, 84416, 10546, 6314, 16944, 84409, 84381, 84411 & 24018 
(see R. 151-158; R. 160-163). 
Utah R. Civ. P. 4; Utah R. Civ. P. 52; Utah R. Civ. P. 56. 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
DISTRICT COURT'S ORDERS 
JOELA.FERRE(7517) 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendants 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140856 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856 
Telephone: (801) 366-0100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NASRULLAKHAN, 
ORDER 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
Case No. 050921490 
THE STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE, : 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC Judge Anthony Quinn 
SAFETY, MR. ROBERT L. FLOWERS,. : 
MS. JANELL B. TUTTLE, ET AL., 
Defendants. 
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs Motion to Stay or 
Continue Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs Motion to Compel, and 
Defendant's Motion for a Protective Order, came before the Court, the Honorable Anthony 
Quinn, for decision. Having reviewed the supporting and opposing memoranda and having 
heard oral argument of counsel the Court makes the following ruling. 
ORIGINAL 
FILES DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
JAN 1 9 2007 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
By 
Deputy Clerk 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. Given the stipulation of the parties, Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and Plaintiffs Motion to Stay are MOOT; 
2. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel and Defendant's Motion for a Protective Order are 
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. After review of the contested documents in camera, 
the Court finds that the government's interest in maintaining confidentiality to portions of the 
contested documents that reference Mr. Khan is outweighed by Mr. Khan's interest in discovery 
of that material. Accordingly, Defendants are ordered to produce copies of the two contested 
documents dated November 8, 2002, and November 22, 2002, except that Defendants may redact 
the references to Federal law enforcement agents and any information pertaining to other 
individuals contained within the reports. Otherwise, Plaintiffs and Defendants' motions are 
DENIED; 
3. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to compel production of other documents, the Motion 
to Compel is DENIED based on the representation that Defendants have conducted a reasonably 
diligent search of their records and based upon knowledge, information, and belief formed after a 
reasonable search have produced to Plaintiff those non-privileged documents they have located 
or identified that pertain to Plaintiff; and 
4. Each party to bear its respective costs and fees. 
2 
DATED this / ^ day of January, 2007. 
Approved as to form: 
Nasrulla Khan 
Plaintiff Pro Se 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NASRULLA KHAN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE, 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC 
SAFETY, MR. ROBERT L. FLOWERS, 
MS. JANELL B. TUTTLE, ET AL., 
Defendants. 
RULING and ORDER 
CASE NO. 050921490 
Honorable Anthony B. Uumn 
The above matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment filed January 25, 2007. The Court having 
carefully considered all the pleadings on file and having been 
fully informed, determines oral argument is not necessary and 
concludes as follows. 
The issue before this Court is whether defendants have shown 
that, as a matter of law, they are entitled to summary judgment 
because they have complied with GRAMA in response to Plaintiff's 
requests for documents. 
Summary Judgment Standard 
Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure mandates, 
summary judgment "shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with 
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law." In reviewing a motion for summary 
judgment, a court "must consider all facts, and all inferences from 
those facts, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." 
(Goodnow v. Sullivan, 2002 UT 21 % 17, 44 P.3d 704.) Summary 
judgment "should be granted only when it clearly appears that there 
is no reasonable probability that the party moved against could 
prevail." {Snyder v. Merkley, 693 P.2d 64, 65 (Utah 1984)). 
Right to Information 
Defendants have succinctly surveyed the federal and Utah case 
law on the public's right to access governmental information, and 
the Court will not reiterate it here. GRAMA outlines the procedures 
Utah's public may use to gain access to the governmental 
information to which they may be entitled. Consequently, the Court 
will only address whether defendants complied with the provisions 
of GRAMA in response to plaintiff's requests. 
Defendants' Compliance with Utah Code Ann.§§ 63-2-101, et seq. 
Utah has enacted the statutes presently known as the 
Government Record Access and Management Act, or GRAMA, to deal with 
the public's ability to access governmental information. (Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 63-2-101, et seq). GRAMA's procedures balance "the publicfs 
right of access to information concerning the conduct of the 
public!s business; and the right of privacy in relation to personal 
data gathered by governmental entities," while acknowledging the 
"public policy interest in allowing a government to restrict access 
to certain records . . . for the public good." (Utah Code Ann. §§ 
63-2-102 (1992)), These procedures work as "guidelines for both 
disclosure and restrictions on access to government records . . 
.[and] establish fair and reasonable records management practices" 
and allow the public to access "a public record free of charge." 
(Id., and Id. at § 201). These procedures require a request for 
information to be in writing and identify the record with 
"reasonable specificity." (Id., at § 204). The governmental entity, 
must respond to such a request by either providing the record, 
denying the request, or informing the person requesting information 
it does not have such a record. (Id.). GRAMA does not require a 
governmental entity to either create a record in response to a 
request, or fulfill a person's records request if the request 
unreasonably duplicates prior records requests from that person. 
(Id. §§ 63-2-201 (8) (a) (i) and (iv) ) . A person "aggrieved" by a 
governmental entity's access determination may appeal the 
determination to the head of the governmental entity, then the State 
Records Committee and then, under certain circumstances, to the 
District Court. (See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-2-401 through 404) . If the 
requester substantially prevails in district court, the court may 
enjoin the actions of a governmental entity or political subdivision 
that violates provisions of GRAMA, and it may assess reasonable 
attorneys1 fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in 
a judicial appeal of a denial of a records request, once it makes 
certain determinations. (See Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-802) . 
Pursuant to these provisions, when plaintiff felt aggrieved by 
the results of his requests for information, plaintiff brought his 
case to this Court through a Petition for Judicial Review and 
subsequent First Amended Petition for Judicial Review. The Court has 
reviewed the complete course of action taken by all parties in this 
case and has determined the material facts are not in disputev. 
Undisputed Material Facts 
This action commenced with written requests plaintiff sent to 
the Department of Public Safety on August 29, 2005. In his first 
request plaintiff asked for "records concerning my complaints to the 
Utah Department of Public Safety and to the Utah Homeland Security 
Department . . . complaints of terrorism and crimes against me, and 
about the illegal actions of the Ogden City Police against me." In 
his second request then to the "Chief Administrative Officer" of the 
Department of Public Safety on September 19, 2005, plaintiff stated 
that because the Department of Public Safety had not responded to 
his prior request within ten days, he was "filing this appeal to you 
concerning the Menial' of my Government Records Access and 
Management Act Request, pursuant to Utah Code Section 63-2-205." On 
October 3, 2005 the Commissioner of Public Safety responded to 
plaintiff's request stating, "[n]o evidence was found to support 
your claims and no formal investigations was conducted . . . the 
Department of Public Safety does not have any records that satisfy 
your GRAMA request. Therefore this is a denial of your [GRAMA] . . 
. appeal." This letter informed plaintiff of his right to appeal 
this denial to the State Records Committee ("Committee"). Plaintiff 
did appeal to the Committee, on November 7, 2005 the Executive 
Secretary of the Committee responded and informed plaintiff the 
Department's claim no records existed did not constitute a denial 
upon which she could schedule a hearing pursuant to Administrative 
Rule R35-2-2(b). This rule requires a party appealing a denial to 
"provide sufficient evidence in the petitioner's statement of facts, 
reasons, and legal authority in support of the appeal, that the 
record did exist at one time, or that the governmental entity has 
concealed, or not sufficiently or improperly searched for the 
record." On December 6, 2005 plaintiff then petitioned this Court 
for judicial review of the Commissioner's response. 
DISCUSSION 
When reviewing a petition for judicial review under GRAMA, the 
district court shall make a decision on the case de novo after 
allowing the introduction of evidence presented to the Committee and 
determine all questions of fact and law without a jury. (Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-2-404 (7) (b) ) . Accordingly, the Court has reached the 
following decision. 
The Court finds, despite the confusion of this case, the 
undisputed material facts undisputedly demonstrate defendants 
conformed with the requirements imposed upon them under the 
applicable portions of GRAMA. Plaintiff claims defendants have 
produced no records in response to his GRAMA request, but 
defendants's have supported their claims that they have no such 
records. Plaintiff has made some extraneous requests throughout his 
appeals process but defendants have consistently supported their 
denials of these requests with supported claim that no records 
exist. Defendants submitted affidavits from the people involved in 
attempting to locate these records, and detailed outlines of the 
procedures followed in this effort. Plaintiff submitted his opinions 
of the material facts and of immaterial facts, but has not shown 
defendants did anything other than all they could under his unduly 
burdensome litany of correspondences to them. 
Plaintiff attempts to create disputes of irrelevant facts or 
disputes of material facts where there simply are none. The material 
facts of this case are those pertaining to plaintiff's GRAMA 
requests and the department's response to his requests. The 
documents introduced as evidence to this Court demonstrate 
defendants' response has met GRAMA's requirements. Plaintiff's 
differing opinions of the facts do not persuade the Court that there 
truly remains any actual dispute of any material fact in this case. 
Plaintiff used the procedures of GRAMA to seek access to 
information to which it entitles him; his dissatisfaction with the 
results does not change the underlying material facts that 
defendants responded to his requests in compliance with GRAMA. GRAMA 
guarantees that certain procedural formalities must be followed in 
response to appropriate requests for information, however it makes 
no guarantee of the results these procedures may achieve. 
The Court finds defendants have complied with the applicable 
laws and procedures of GRAMA and have given plaintiff information 
to which he was entitled in response to his requests. Defendants 
have complied with GRAMA, have acted appropriately under the law, 
and accordingly defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a 
matter of law. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby 
GRANTED. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other 
order is required. 
ADDENDUM *'B 
PARTS OF THE RECORD OF 
CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
Department of Public Safety 
ROBERT L. FLOWERS 
Commissioner 
October 3,2005 
Lieutenant Governor 
Mr. Nasrulla Khan 
663 22nd Street, #16 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Re: Government Records Access and Management Act Appeal. 
Dear Mr. Khan: 
Reference is made to your GRAMA appeal dated September 19,2005 to the Utah 
Department of Public Safety. In your original request, you asked for records of the 
department regarding "complaints of terrorism and crimes against me, and about the 
illegal actions of the Ogden City Police against me." This is the same request you have 
made on several prior occasions to the Department of Public Safety. You have also 
requested records of Agent John Keyser regarding his investigation of you. Captain 
Mitch McKee has previously notified you that the department has never conducted such 
an investigation and that there are no records that satisfy your request. John Keyser 
spoke with you regarding your complaints of terrorism and crimes against you by Ogden 
City. No evidence was found to support your claims and no formal investigation was 
conducted. The Department of Public Safety closed this matter. 
The Department of Public Safety does not have any records that satisfy your 
GRAMA request. Therefore, this is a denial of your Government Records Access and 
Management Act appeal. You have the right to appeal this denial to the State Records 
Committee pursuant to Utah Code. Ann. §63-2-403, or to the district court pursuant to 
§63-2-404. The appeal must be filed within 30 days following the date of this denial. 
The State Records Committee secretary is Janell Tuttle located at 346 South Rio Grande 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
Thank you for your consideration in this matter. 
Sincerely, 
Robert L. Flowers 
Commissioner of Public Safety 
cc: Governor Jon Huntsman 
State of Utah 
NM. HUNTSMAN, JR. 
Governor 
DPS/SRC 28 
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Agorit DOUG MILLER Requested By: ANDY CAMPBELL MNI#: 30014348 
Date Reported: 06/05&Sfig Date & Time Occured: 06/05/2003 
Remarks: COMPLAINT BY GOVERNOR MIKE LEAVITT - LETTER SENT BY ME W»®i»<i4®l«SiN©<OF 
POSSIBLE CRIMINAL ACTIONS"- REFRAIN FROM CONT 
Offense: COMPLAINANT 
Property 
NO 
Narrative 
SOURCE 
Agont Doug Miller 
Utah Highway Patrol - Section 22 
Alcohol Enforcement Team/ Special Investigations 
3888 West 5400 South 
Kearns. Utah 84118 
Phone: 955-2145 
SYNOPSIS 
On 8-2^fpf contacted by Joe/ Ferre at the Utah Attorney Generaf Office. Mr Ferre requested that f send hfm a ca 
that I waslnvolved with concerning Nasrulla Khan. A cover sheet with the case number and a short synopsis was 
"faxed" to Mr. Ferre on 8-23-06 
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UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY INVESTIGATIONS Page #: 1 
Investigation Report Printed on: 08/23/2006 
Case Number: 2003-00876 SIDRM TERRORISTIC THREATS NASRULLA KAHN 
Agent: DOUG MILLER Requested By: ANDY CAMPBELL MNI#: 30014348 
Date Reported: 06/05/2003 Date 4 Time Occured: 06/05/2003 
Remarks: COMPLAINT BY GOVERNOR MIKE LEAVITT - LETTER SENT BY ME TO KHAN ADVISING OF 
POSSIBLE CRIMINAL ACTIONS - REFRAIN FROM CONT 
Offense: COMPLAINANT 
Property 
"NO ' 
Narrative 
SOURCE 
Agent Doug Miller 
Utah Highway Patrol - Section 22 
Alcohol Enforcement Team/ Special Investigations 
3888 West 5400 South 
Kearns, Utah 84118 
Phone: 955-2145 
SYNOPSIS 
On 8-23-061 contacted by Joel Ferre at the Utah Attorney General Office. Mr Ferre requested that I send him a case 
that I was involved with concerning Nasrulla Khan. A cover sheet with the case number and a short synopsis was 
"faxed" to Mr. Ferre on 8-23-06 
2^2 
Nasrulla Khan 
663 22nd Street, #16 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
(801)621-0995 
August 29, 2005 
Utah Department of Public Safety 
4501 South 2700 West 
Box 141775 
Salt Lake City, UT 84119 
Re: Government Records Access and Management Act Request 
The Utah Department of Public Safety: 
Pursuant to Utah's Government Records Access and Management Act, I am requesting 
records concerning my complaints to the Utah Department of Public Safety and to the Utah 
Homeland Security Department. Following is the information concerning which I am requesting 
the records: 
On November 8, 2002,1 had written to the Utah Homeland Security Department about my 
complaint of terrorism and crimes against me, and about the illegal actions of the Ogden City Police 
against me. I had written to Mr. Scott Behunin, Mr. Sidney Groll, Mr. Jim Keith, Mr. Doug Miller, 
and Mr. Mitch McKee of the Utah Department of Public Safety about my complaints. I had also 
written to Mr. Robert Flowers and Mr. Verdi White (the Commissioner and the Deputy 
Commissioner of the Utah Department of Public Safety, respectively) about my complaints. Mr. 
Mitch McKee mentioned Agent John Keyser's name with reference to my complaints; I am 
requesting Mr. Keyser's records, too. On April 17, 2003,1 had filed a complaint again with the 
Ogden Police (Case number 03-30223) concerning the 'recent' crimes against me; the Police did 
not investigate it; I had informed the Utah Department of Public Safety about that police 
complaint and about the failure of the Ogden Police to investigate it. Also, in 1995 or 1996,1 
had contacted the Utah Department of Public Safety about Ogden Police. 
Nasrulla Khan 
P.S. The above is my new address. 
HOMELAND SECURITY TASKFORCE Page #: 1 
Investigation Report Printed on: 04/15/2005 
Case Number: 2002-00175 HLS MM NASRULLA KHAN! 
Agent: MCKEE Requested By: CPT MITCH MCKEE1 MNI#: 20020273 
Date Reported: 11/08/2002 Date & Time Occured: 1t/08/2002 
Remarks: 
Offense: 
Property 
NO ~ 
Narrative 
SOURCE 
DPS Web page through Col. Randy Johnson 
SYNOPSIS 
A person identifying himself and Nasrulla Khan wrote a complaint on our web page complaining on Ogden City Police 
for not investigating crimes against him. Through contacts with the FBI I have found out that this person has made 
various complaints and has filed many law suits that have been dismissed. 
DETAIL 
The following web contact was received from a person stating that his name was Nasrulla Khan. 
name: 
Nasrulla Khan 
Utah_Resident: 
Yes 
comments: 
I understand your Office handles Homeland Security matters in 
Utah. 
Since 1995, the officials in Utah, induding the Ogden 
Oty Police, have covered up the evidence of continuing crimes 
against me dnd threats en ™y life, fe!s*fied their reports, 
covered up the names of the alleged criminals, etc. I consider 
the threats and crimes against me since 1994 to be acts of terrorism 
against me. The Police did not investigate the evidence and 
those crimes against me, and did not charge anyone with those 
continuing crimes and acts of terrorism against me. The officials 
in Utah have been fully aware of all of these facts, which they 
have not disputed. I am a U.S. citizen. 
I have the names of 
those officials and the evidence to support my facts. Please 
contact me for the evidence and the names of those officials. 
My phone number is (801) 621-0995. 
J have notified Mr. Tom 
Ridge (the Homeland Security Advisor) and President Bush about 
this. 
Sincerely, Nasrulla Khan. 
Senders IP Address : 198.60.5.1 
Senders Host Name : 198.60.5.1 
^~> r—r < ^ 
ADDENDUM "C" 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES 
W U U 1 1 W U V U U V U V 7 1 1 \J~>-^~ ±\J4* i ag<^ i u i i 
63-2-102. Legislative intent. 
(1) In enacting this act, the Legislature recognizes two constitutional rights: 
(a) the public's right of access to information concerning the conduct of the public's business; and 
(b) the right of privacy in relation to personal data gathered by governmental entities. 
(2) The Legislature also recognizes a public policy interest in allowing a government to restrict 
access to certain records, as specified in this chapter, for the public good. 
(3) It is the intent of the Legislature to: 
(a) promote the public's right of easy and reasonable access to unrestricted public records; 
(b) specify those conditions under which the public interest in allowing restrictions on access to 
records may outweigh the public's interest in access; 
(c) prevent abuse of confidentiality by governmental entities by permitting confidential treatment of 
records only as provided in this chapter; 
(d) provide guidelines for both disclosure and restrictions on access to government records, which are 
based on the equitable weighing of the pertinent interests and which are consistent with nationwide 
standards of information practices; 
(e) favor public access when, in the application of this act, countervailing interests are of equal 
weight; and 
(f) establish fair and reasonable records management practices. 
Amended by Chapter 280, 1992 General Session 
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63-2-103. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Audit" means: 
(a) a systematic examination of financial, management, program, and related records for the purpose 
of determining the fair presentation of financial statements, adequacy of internal controls, or compliance 
with laws and regulations; or 
(b) a systematic examination of program procedures and operations for the purpose of determining 
their effectiveness, economy, efficiency, and compliance with statutes and regulations. 
(2) "Chronological logs" mean the regular and customary summary records of law enforcement 
agencies and other public safety agencies that show: 
(a) the time and general nature of police, fire, and paramedic calls made to the agency; 
(b) and any arrests or jail bookings made by the agency. 
(3) "Classification," "classify," and their derivative forms mean determining whether a record series, 
record, or information within a record is public, private, controlled, protected, or exempt from disclosure 
under Subsection 63-2-201 (3)(b). 
(4) (a) "Computer program" means: 
(i) a series of instructions or statements that permit the functioning of a computer system in a manner 
designed to provide storage, retrieval, and manipulation of data from the computer system; and 
(ii) any associated documentation and source material that explain how to operate the computer 
program. 
(b) "Computer program" does not mean: 
(i) the original data, including numbers, text, voice, graphics, and images; 
(ii) analysis, compilation, and other manipulated forms of the original data produced by use of the 
program; or 
(iii) the mathematical or statistical formulas, excluding the underlying mathematical algorithms 
contained in the program, that would be used if the manipulated forms of the original data were to be 
produced manually. 
(5) (a) "Contractor" means: 
(i) any person who contracts with a governmental entity to provide goods or services directly to a 
governmental entity; or 
(ii) any private, nonprofit organization that receives funds from a governmental entity, 
(b) "Contractor" does not mean a private provider. 
(6) "Controlled record" means a record containing data on individuals that is controlled as provided 
by Section 63-2-303. 
(7) "Designation," "designate," and their derivative forms mean indicating, based on a governmental 
entity's familiarity with a record series or based on a governmental entity's review of a reasonable 
sample of a record series, the primary classification that a majority of records in a record series would be 
given if classified and the classification that other records typically present in the record series would be 
given if classified. 
(8) "Elected official" means each person elected to a state office, county office, municipal office, 
school board or school district office, local district office, or special service district office, but does not 
include judges. 
(9) "Explosive" means a chemical compound, device, or mixture: 
(a) commonly used or intended for the purpose of producing an explosion; and 
(b) that contains oxidizing or combustive units or other ingredients in proportions, quantities, or 
packing so that: 
(i) an ignition by fire, friction, concussion, percussion, or detonator of any part of the compound or 
mixture may cause a sudden generation of highly heated gases; and 
(ii) the resultant gaseous pressures are capable of: 
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(A) producing destructive effects on contiguous objects; or 
(B) causing death or serious bodily injury. 
(10) "Government audit agency" means any governmental entity that conducts an audit. 
(11) (a) "Governmental entity" means: 
(i) executive department agencies of the state, the offices of the governor, lieutenant governor, state 
auditor, attorney general, and state treasurer, the Board of Pardons and Parole, the Board of Examiners, 
the National Guard, the Career Service Review Board, the State Board of Education, the State Board of 
Regents, and the State Archives; 
(ii) the Office of the Legislative Auditor General, Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst, Office of 
Legislative Research and General Counsel, the Legislature, and legislative committees, except any 
political party, group, caucus, or rules or sifting committee of the Legislature; 
(iii) courts, the Judicial Council, the Office of the Court Administrator, and similar administrative 
units in the judicial branch; 
(iv) any state-funded institution of higher education or public education; or 
(v) any political subdivision of the state, but, if a political subdivision has adopted an ordinance or a 
policy relating to information practices pursuant to Section 63-2-701, this chapter shall apply to the 
political subdivision to the extent specified in Section 63-2-701 or as specified in any other section of 
this chapter that specifically refers to political subdivisions. 
(b) "Governmental entity" also means every office, agency, board, bureau, committee, department, 
advisory board, or commission of an entity listed in Subsection (1 l)(a) that is funded or established by 
the government to carry out the public's business. 
(12) "Gross compensation" means every form of remuneration payable for a given period to an 
individual for services provided including salaries, commissions, vacation pay, severance pay, bonuses, 
and any board, rent, housing, lodging, payments in kind, and any similar benefit received from the 
individual's employer. 
(13) "Individual" means a human being. 
(14) (a) "Initial contact report" means an initial written or recorded report, however titled, prepared 
by peace officers engaged in public patrol or response duties describing official actions initially taken in 
response to either a public complaint about or the discovery of an apparent violation of law, which 
report may describe: 
(i) the date, time, location, and nature of the complaint, the incident, or offense; 
(ii) names of victims; 
(iii) the nature or general scope of the agency's initial actions taken in response to the incident; 
(iv) the general nature of any injuries or estimate of damages sustained in the incident; 
(v) the name, address, and other identifying information about any person arrested or charged in 
connection with the incident; or 
(vi) the identity of the public safety personnel, except undercover personnel, or 
prosecuting attorney involved in responding to the initial incident. 
(b) Initial contact reports do not include follow-up or investigative reports prepared after the initial 
contact report. However, if the information specified in Subsection (14)(a) appears in follow-up or 
investigative reports, it may only be treated confidentially if it is private, controlled, protected, or 
exempt from disclosure under Subsection 63-2-201 (3)(b). 
(15) "Legislative body" means the Legislature. 
(16) "Notice of compliance" means a statement confirming that a governmental entity has complied 
with a records committee order. 
(17) "Person" means: 
(a) an individual; 
(b) a nonprofit or profit corporation; 
(c) a partnership; 
(d) a sole proprietorship; 
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(e) other type of business organization; or 
(f) any combination acting in concert with one another. 
(18) "Private provider" means any person who contracts with a governmental entity to provide 
services directly to the public. 
(19) "Private record" means a record containing data on individuals that is private as provided by 
Section 63-2-302. 
(20) "Protected record" means a record that is classified protected as provided by Section 63-2-304. 
(21) "Public record" means a record that is not private, controlled, or protected and that is not exempt 
from disclosure as provided in Subsection 63-2-201 (3)(b). 
(22) (a) "Record" means a book, letter, document, paper, map, plan, photograph, film, card, tape, 
recording, electronic data, or other documentary material regardless of physical form or characteristics: 
(i) that is prepared, owned, received, or retained by a governmental entity or political subdivision; 
and 
(ii) where all of the information in the original is reproducible by photocopy or other mechanical or 
electronic means. 
(b) "Record" does not mean: 
(i) a personal note or personal communication prepared or received by an employee or officer of a 
governmental entity in the employee's or officer's private capacity; 
(ii) a temporary draft or similar material prepared for the originator's personal use or prepared by the 
originator for the personal use of an individual for whom the originator is working; 
(iii) material that is legally owned by an individual in the individual's private capacity; 
(iv) material to which access is limited by the laws of copyright or patent unless the copyright or 
patent is owned by a governmental entity or political subdivision; 
(v) proprietary software; 
(vi) junk mail or a commercial publication received by a governmental entity or an official or 
employee of a governmental entity; 
(vii) a book that is cataloged, indexed, or inventoried and contained in the collections of a library 
open to the public; 
(viii) material that is cataloged, indexed, or inventoried and contained in the collections 
of a library open to the public, regardless of physical form or characteristics of the material; 
(ix) a daily calendar or other personal note prepared by the originator for the originator's personal use 
or for the personal use of an individual for whom the originator is working; 
(x) a computer program that is developed or purchased by or for any governmental entity for its own 
use; 
(xi) a note or internal memorandum prepared as part of the deliberative process by: 
(A) a member of the judiciary; 
(B) an administrative law judge; 
(C) a member of the Board of Pardons and Parole; or 
(D) a member of any other body charged by law with performing a quasi-judicial function; or 
(xii) a telephone number or similar code used to access a mobile communication device that is used 
by an employee or officer of a governmental entity, provided that the employee or officer of the 
governmental entity has designated at least one business telephone number that is a public record as 
provided in Section 63-2-301. 
(23) "Record series" means a group of records that may be treated as a unit for purposes of 
designation, description, management, or disposition. 
(24) "Records committee" means the State Records Committee created in Section 63-2-501. 
(25) "Records officer" means the individual appointed by the chief administrative officer of each 
governmental entity, or the political subdivision to work with state archives in the care, maintenance, 
scheduling, designation, classification, disposal, and preservation of records. 
(26) "Schedule," "scheduling," and their derivative forms mean the process of specifying the length 
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of time each record series should be retained by a governmental entity for administrative, legal, fiscal, or 
historical purposes and when each record series should be transferred to the state archives or destroyed. 
(27) "Sponsored research" means research, training, and other sponsored activities as defined by the 
federal Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget: 
(a) conducted: 
(i) by an institution within the state system of higher education defined in Section 53B-1-102; and 
(ii) through an office responsible for sponsored projects or programs; and 
(b) funded or otherwise supported by an external: 
(i) person that is not created or controlled by the institution within the state system of higher 
education; or 
(ii) federal, state, or local governmental entity. 
(28) "State archives" means the Division of Archives and Records Service created in Section 63-2-
901. 
(29) "State archivist" means the director of the state archives. 
(30) "Summary data" means statistical records and compilations that contain data derived from 
private, controlled, or protected information but that do not disclose private, controlled, or protected 
information. 
Amended by Chapter 329, 2007 General Session 
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63-2-201. Right to inspect records and receive copies of records. 
(1) Every person has the right to inspect a public record free of charge, and the right to take a copy of 
a public record during normal working hours, subject to Sections 63-2-203 and 63-2-204. 
(2) A record is public unless otherwise expressly provided by statute. 
(3) The following records are not public: 
(a) a record that is private, controlled, or protected under Sections 63-2-302, 63-2-302.5, 63-2-303, 
and 63-2-304; and 
(b) a record to which access is restricted pursuant to court rule, another state statute, federal statute, 
or federal regulation, including records for which access is governed or restricted as a condition of 
participation in a state or federal program or for receiving state or federal funds. 
(4) Only a record specified in Section 63-2-302, 63-2-302.5, 63-2-303, or 63-2-304 may be classified 
private, controlled, or protected. 
(5) (a) A governmental entity may not disclose a record that is private, controlled, or protected to any 
person except as provided in Subsection (5)(b), Subsection (5)(c), Section 63-2-202, 63-2-206, or 63-2-
302.5. 
(b) A governmental entity may disclose a record that is private under Subsection 63-2-302(2) or 
protected under Section 63-2-304 to persons other than those specified in Section 63-2-202 or 63-2-206 
if the head of a governmental entity, or a designee, determines that: 
(i) there is no interest in restricting access to the record; or 
(ii) the interests favoring access outweighs the interest favoring restriction of access. 
(c) In addition to the disclosure under Subsection (5)(b), a governmental entity may disclose a record 
that is protected under Subsection 63-2-304(51) if: 
(i) the head of the governmental entity, or a designee, determines that the disclosure: 
(A) is mutually beneficial to: 
(I) the subject of the record; 
(II) the governmental entity; and 
(III) the public; and 
(B) serves a public purpose related to: 
(I) public safety; or 
(II) consumer protection; and 
(ii) the person who receives the record from the governmental entity agrees not to use or allow the 
use of the record for advertising or solicitation purposes. 
(6) (a) The disclosure of a record to which access is governed or limited pursuant to court rule, 
another state statute, federal statute, or federal regulation, including a record for which access is 
governed or limited as a condition of participation in a state or federal program or for receiving state or 
federal funds, is governed by the specific provisions of that statute, rule, or regulation. 
(b) This chapter applies to records described in Subsection (6)(a) insofar as this chapter is not 
inconsistent with the statute, rule, or regulation. 
(7) A governmental entity shall provide a person with a certified copy of a record if: 
(a) the person requesting the record has a right to inspect it; 
(b) the person identifies the record with reasonable specificity; and 
(c) the person pays the lawful fees. 
(8) (a) In response to a request, a governmental entity is not required to: 
(i) create a record; 
(ii) compile, format, manipulate, package, summarize, or tailor information; 
(iii) provide a record in a particular format, medium, or program not currently maintained by the 
governmental entity; 
(iv) fulfill a person's records request if the request unreasonably duplicates prior records requests 
from that person; or 
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(v) fill a person's records request if: 
(A) the record requested is accessible in the identical physical form and content in a public 
publication or product produced by the governmental entity receiving the request; 
(B) the governmental entity provides the person requesting the record with the public publication or 
product; and 
(C) the governmental entity specifies where the record can be found in the public publication or 
product. 
(b) Upon request, a governmental entity may provide a record in a particular form under Subsection 
(8)(a)(ii) or (iii) if: 
(i) the governmental entity determines it is able to do so without unreasonably interfering with the 
governmental entity's duties and responsibilities; and 
(ii) the requester agrees to pay the governmental entity for providing the record in the requested form 
in accordance with Section 63-2-203. 
(9) (a) A governmental entity may allow a person requesting more than 50 pages of records to copy 
the records if: 
(i) the records are contained in files that do not contain records that are exempt from disclosure, or 
the records may be segregated to remove private, protected, or controlled information from disclosure; 
and 
(ii) the governmental entity provides reasonable safeguards to protect the public from the potential 
for loss of a public record. 
(b) When the requirements of Subsection (9)(a) are met, the governmental entity may: 
(i) provide the requester with the facilities for copying the requested records and require that the 
requester make the copies; or 
(ii) allow the requester to provide the requester's own copying facilities and personnel to make the 
copies at the governmental entity's offices and waive the fees for copying the records. 
(10) (a) A governmental entity that owns an intellectual property right and that offers the intellectual 
property right for sale or license may control by ordinance or policy the duplication and distribution of 
the material based on terms the governmental entity considers to be in the public interest. 
(b) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit or impair the rights or protections granted to the 
governmental entity under federal copyright or patent law as a result of its ownership of the intellectual 
property right. 
(11) A governmental entity may not use the physical form, electronic or otherwise, in which a record 
is stored to deny, or unreasonably hinder the rights of a person to inspect and receive a copy of a record 
under this chapter. 
(12) A governmental entity may provide access to an electronic copy of a record in lieu of providing 
access to its paper equivalent. 
Amended by Chapter 174, 2006 General Session 
WtCI.ll V^WVIV UV-'UtlV^ll \ J ^ - ^ _ ^ V T rage i u i ^ 
63-2-204. Requests — Time limit for response and extraordinary circumstances. 
(1) A person making a request for a record shall furnish the governmental entity with a written 
request containing: 
(a) the person's name, mailing address, and daytime telephone number, if available; and 
(b) a description of the record requested that identifies the record with reasonable specificity. 
(2) (a) Subject to Subsection (2)(b), a person making a request for a record shall submit the request to 
the governmental entity that prepares, owns, or retains the record. 
(b) In response to a request for a record, a governmental entity may not provide a record that it has 
received under Section 63-2-206 as a shared record if the record was shared for the purpose of auditing, 
if the governmental entity is authorized by state statute to conduct an audit. 
(c) If a governmental entity is prohibited from providing a record under Subsection (2)(b), it shall: 
(i) deny the records request; and 
(ii) inform the person making the request that records requests must be submitted to the 
governmental entity that prepares, owns, or retains the record. 
(d) A governmental entity may make rules in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act, specifying where and to whom requests for access shall be directed. 
(3) (a) As soon as reasonably possible, but no later than ten business days after receiving a written 
request, or five business days after receiving a written request if the requester demonstrates that 
expedited response to the record request benefits the public rather than the person, the governmental 
entity shall respond to the request by: 
(i) approving the request and providing the record; 
(ii) denying the request; 
(iii) notifying the requester that it does not maintain the record and providing, if known, the name 
and address of the governmental entity that does maintain the record; or 
(iv) notifying the requester that because of one of the extraordinary circumstances listed in 
Subsection (4), it cannot immediately approve or deny the request. 
(b) The notice described in Subsection (3)(a)(iv) shall: 
(i) describe the circumstances relied upon; and 
(ii) specify the date when the records will be available. 
(c) Any person who requests a record to obtain information for a story or report for publication or 
broadcast to the general public is presumed to be acting to benefit the public rather than a person. 
(4) The following circumstances constitute "extraordinary circumstances" that allow a governmental 
entity to delay approval or denial by an additional period of time as specified in Subsection (5) if the 
governmental entity determines that due to the extraordinary circumstances it cannot respond within the 
time limits provided in Subsection (3): 
(a) another governmental entity is using the record, in which case the originating governmental entity 
shall promptly request that the governmental entity currently in possession return the record; 
(b) another governmental entity is using the record as part of an audit, and returning the record before 
the completion of the audit would impair the conduct of the audit; 
(c) (i) the request is for a voluminous quantity of records or a record series containing a 
substantial number of records; 
(ii) the requester seeks a substantial number of records or records series in requests filed within five 
working days of each other; 
(d) the governmental entity is currently processing a large number of records requests; 
(e) the request requires the governmental entity to review a large number of records to locate the 
records requested; 
(f) the decision to release a record involves legal issues that require the governmental entity to seek 
legal counsel for the analysis of statutes, rules, ordinances, regulations, or case law; 
(g) segregating information that the requester is entitled to inspect from information that the requester 
is not entitled to inspect requires extensive editing; or 
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(h) segregating information that the requester is entitled to inspect from information that the requester 
is not entitled to inspect requires computer programming. 
(5) If one of the extraordinary circumstances listed in Subsection (4) precludes approval or denial 
within the time specified in Subsection (3), the following time limits apply to the extraordinary 
circumstances: 
(a) for claims under Subsection (4)(a), the governmental entity currently in possession of the record 
shall return the record to the originating entity within five business days of the request for the return 
unless returning the record would impair the holder's work; 
(b) for claims under Subsection (4)(b), the originating governmental entity shall notify the requester 
when the record is available for inspection and copying; 
(c) for claims under Subsections (4)(c), (d), and (e), the governmental entity shall: 
(i) disclose the records that it has located which the requester is entitled to inspect; 
(ii) provide the requester with an estimate of the amount of time it will take to finish the work 
required to respond to the request; 
(iii) complete the work and disclose those records that the requester is entitled to inspect as soon as 
reasonably possible; and 
(iv) for any person that does not establish a right to an expedited response as authorized by 
Subsection (3)(a), a governmental entity may choose to: 
(A) require the person to provide for copying of the records as provided in Subsection 63-2-201(9); 
or 
(B) treat a request for multiple records as separate record requests, and respond sequentially to each 
request; 
(d) for claims under Subsection (4)(f), the governmental entity shall either approve or deny the 
request within five business days after the response time specified for the original request has expired; 
(e) for claims under Subsection (4)(g), the governmental entity shall fulfill the request within 15 
business days from the date of the original request; or 
(f) for claims under Subsection (4)(h), the governmental entity shall complete its programming and 
disclose the requested records as soon as reasonably possible. 
(6) (a) If a request for access is submitted to an office of a governmental entity other than that 
specified by rale in accordance with Subsection (2), the office shall promptly forward the request to the 
appropriate office. 
(b) If the request is forwarded promptly, the time limit for response begins when the record is 
received by the office specified by rule. 
(7) If the governmental entity fails to provide the requested records or issue a denial 
within the specified time period, that failure is considered the equivalent of a determination denying 
access to the record. 
Amended by Chapter 64, 2006 General Session 
r a g e l u n 
63-2-205. Denials. 
(1) If the governmental entity denies the request in whole or part, it shall provide a notice of denial to 
the requester either in person or by sending the notice to the requester's address. 
(2) The notice of denial shall contain the following information: 
(a) a description of the record or portions of the record to which access was denied, provided that the 
description does not disclose private, controlled, or protected information or information exempt from 
disclosure under Subsection 63-2-201 (3)(b); 
(b) citations to the provisions of this chapter, court rule or order, another state statute, federal statute, 
or federal regulation that exempt the record or portions of the record from disclosure, provided that the 
citations do not disclose private, controlled, or protected information or information exempt from 
disclosure under Subsection 63-2-201(3)(b); 
(c) a statement that the requester has the right to appeal the denial to the chief administrative officer 
of the governmental entity; and 
(d) the time limits for filing an appeal, and the name and business address of the chief administrative 
officer of the governmental entity. 
(3) Unless otherwise required by a court or agency of competent jurisdiction, a governmental entity 
may not destroy or give up custody of any record to which access was denied until the period for an 
appeal has expired or the end of the appeals process, including judicial appeal. 
Amended by Chapter 280, 1992 General Session 
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63-2-401. Appeal to head of governmental entity. 
(1) (a) Any person aggrieved by a governmental entity's access determination under this chapter, 
including a person not a party to the governmental entity's proceeding, may appeal the determination 
within 30 days to the chief administrative officer of the governmental entity by filing a notice of appeal. 
(b) If a governmental entity claims extraordinary circumstances and specifies the date when the 
records will be available under Subsection 63-2-204(3), and, if the requester believes the extraordinary 
circumstances do not exist or that the time specified is unreasonable, the requester may appeal the 
governmental entity's claim of extraordinary circumstances or date for compliance within 30 days after 
notification of a claim of extraordinary circumstances by the governmental entity, despite the lack of a 
"determination" or its equivalent under Subsection 63-2-204(7). 
(2) The notice of appeal shall contain the following information: 
(a) the petitioner's name, mailing address, and daytime telephone number; and 
(b) the relief sought. 
(3) The petitioner may file a short statement of facts, reasons, and legal authority in support of the 
appeal. 
(4) (a) If the appeal involves a record that is the subject of a business confidentiality claim under 
Section 63-2-308, the chief administrative officer shall: 
(i) send notice of the requester's appeal to the business confidentiality claimant within three business 
days after receiving notice, except that if notice under this section must be given to more than 35 
persons, it shall be given as soon as reasonably possible; and 
(ii) send notice of the business confidentiality claim and the schedule for the chief administrative 
officer's determination to the requester within three business days after receiving notice of the 
requester's appeal. 
(b) The claimant shall have seven business days after notice is sent by the administrative officer to 
submit further support for the claim of business confidentiality. 
(5) (a) The chief administrative officer shall make a determination on the appeal within the following 
period of time: 
(i) within five business days after the chief administrative officer's receipt of the notice of appeal; or 
(ii) within twelve business days after the governmental entity sends the requester's notice of appeal to 
a person who submitted a claim of business confidentiality. 
(b) If the chief administrative officer fails to make a determination within the time specified in 
Subsection (5)(a), the failure shall be considered the equivalent of an order denying the appeal. 
(c) The provisions of this section notwithstanding, the parties participating in the proceeding may, by 
agreement, extend the time periods specified in this section. 
(6) The chief administrative officer may, upon consideration and weighing of the various interests 
and public policies pertinent to the classification and disclosure or nondisclosure, order the disclosure of 
information properly classified as private under Section 63-2-302(2) or protected under Section 63-2-
304 if the interests favoring access outweigh the interests favoring restriction of access. 
(7) The governmental entity shall send written notice of the determination of the chief administrative 
officer to all participants. If the chief administrative officer affirms the denial in 
whole or in part, the denial shall include a statement that the requester has the right to appeal the denial 
to either the records committee or district court, the time limits for filing an appeal, and the name and 
business address of the executive secretary of the records committee. 
(8) A person aggrieved by a governmental entity's classification or designation determination under 
this chapter, but who is not requesting access to the records, may appeal that determination using the 
procedures provided in this section. If a nonrequester is the only appellant, the procedures provided in 
this section shall apply, except that the determination on the appeal shall be made within 30 days after 
receiving the notice of appeal. 
(9) The duties of the chief administrative officer under this section may be delegated. 
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63-2-403. Appeals to the records committee. 
(1) A petitioner, including an aggrieved person who did not participate in the appeal to the 
governmental entity's chief administrative officer, may appeal to the records committee by filing a 
notice of appeal with the executive secretary no later than: 
(a) 30 days after the chief administrative officer of the governmental entity has granted or denied the 
record request in whole or in part, including a denial under Subsection 63-2-204(7); 
(b) 45 days after the original request for a record if: 
(i) the circumstances described in Subsection 63-2-401 (l)(b) occur; and 
(ii) the chief administrative officer failed to make a determination under Section 63-2-401. 
(2) The notice of appeal shall contain the following information: 
(a) the petitioner's name, mailing address, and daytime telephone number; 
(b) a copy of any denial of the record request; and 
(c) the relief sought. 
(3) The petitioner may file a short statement of facts, reasons, and legal authority in support of the 
appeal. 
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(b), no later than five business days after receiving a 
notice of appeal, the executive secretary of the records committee shall: 
(i) schedule a hearing for the records committee to discuss the appeal at the next regularly scheduled 
committee meeting falling at least 14 days after the date the notice of appeal is filed but no longer than 
52 calendar days after the date the notice of appeal was filed except that the records committee may 
schedule an expedited hearing upon application of the petitioner and good cause shown; 
(ii) send a copy of the notice of hearing to the petitioner; and 
(iii) send a copy of the notice of appeal, supporting statement, and a notice of hearing to: 
(A) each member of the records committee; 
(B) the records officer and the chief administrative officer of the governmental entity from which the 
appeal originated; 
(C) any person who made a business confidentiality claim under Section 63-2-308 for a record that is 
the subject of the appeal; and 
(D) all persons who participated in the proceedings before the governmental entity's chief 
administrative officer. 
(b) (i) The executive secretary of the records committee may decline to schedule a hearing if the 
record series that is the subject of the appeal has been found by the committee in a previous hearing 
involving the same government entity to be appropriately classified as private, controlled, or protected. 
(ii) (A) If the executive secretary of the records committee declines to schedule a hearing, the 
executive secretary of the records committee shall send a notice to the petitioner indicating that the 
request for hearing has been denied and the reason for the denial. 
(B) The committee shall make rules to implement this section as provided by Title 63, Chapter 46a, 
Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(5) (a) A written statement of facts, reasons, and legal authority in support of the governmental 
entity's position must be submitted to the executive secretary of the records committee not later than five 
business days before the hearing. 
(b) The governmental entity shall send a copy of the written statement to the petitioner 
by first class mail, postage prepaid. The executive secretary shall forward a copy of the written 
statement to each member of the records committee. 
(6) (a) No later than ten business days after the notice of appeal is sent by the executive secretary, a 
person whose legal interests may be substantially affected by the proceeding may file a request for 
intervention before the records committee. 
(b) Any written statement of facts, reasons, and legal authority in support of the intervener's position 
shall be filed with the request for intervention. 
(c) The person seeking intervention shall provide copies of the statement described in Subsection (6) 
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(b) to all parties to the proceedings before the records committee. 
(7) The records committee shall hold a hearing within the period of time described in Subsection (4). 
(8) At the hearing, the records committee shall allow the parties to testify, present evidence, and 
comment on the issues. The records committee may allow other interested persons to comment on the 
issues. 
(9) (a) The records committee may review the disputed records. However, if the committee is 
weighing the various interests under Subsection (11), the committee must review the disputed records. 
The review shall be in camera. 
(b) Members of the records committee may not disclose any information or record reviewed by the 
committee in camera unless the disclosure is otherwise authorized by this chapter. 
(10) (a) Discovery is prohibited, but the records committee may issue subpoenas or other orders to 
compel production of necessary evidence. 
(b) When the subject of a records committee subpoena disobeys or fails to comply with the subpoena, 
the records committee may file a motion for an order to compel obedience to the subpoena with the 
district court. 
(c) The records committee's review shall be de novo. 
(11) (a) No later than five business days after the hearing, the records committee shall issue a signed 
order either granting the petition in whole or in part or upholding the determination of the governmental 
entity in whole or in part. 
(b) The records committee may, upon consideration and weighing of the various interests and public 
policies pertinent to the classification and disclosure or nondisclosure, order the disclosure of 
information properly classified as private, controlled, or protected if the public interest favoring access 
outweighs the interest favoring restriction of access. 
(c) In making a determination under Subsection (1 l)(b), the records committee shall consider and, 
where appropriate, limit the requester's use and further disclosure of the record in order to protect: 
(i) privacy interests in the case of a private or controlled record; 
(ii) business confidentiality interests in the case of a record protected under Subsection 63-2-304(1), 
(2),(40)(a)(ii),or(40)(a)(vi);and 
(iii) privacy interests or the public interest in the case of other protected records. 
(12) The order of the records committee shall include: 
(a) a statement of reasons for the decision, including citations to this chapter, court rule or order, 
another state statute, federal statute, or federal regulation that governs disclosure of the record, provided 
that the citations do not disclose private, controlled, or protected information; 
(b) a description of the record or portions of the record to which access was ordered or 
denied, provided that the description does not disclose private, controlled, or protected information or 
information exempt from disclosure under Subsection 63-2-201(3)(b); 
(c) a statement that any party to the proceeding before the records committee may appeal the records 
committee's decision to district court; and 
(d) a brief summary of the appeals process, the time limits for filing an appeal, and a notice that in 
order to protect its rights on appeal, the party may wish to seek advice from an attorney. 
(13) If the records committee fails to issue a decision within 57 calendar days of the filing of the 
notice of appeal, that failure shall be considered the equivalent of an order denying the appeal. The 
petitioner shall notify the records committee in writing if the petitioner considers the appeal denied. 
(14) (a) Unless a notice of intent to appeal is filed under Subsection (14)(b), each party to the 
proceeding shall comply with the order of the records committee. 
(b) If a party disagrees with the order of the records committee, that party may file a notice of intent 
to appeal the order of the records committee. 
(c) If the records committee orders the governmental entity to produce a record and no appeal is filed, 
or if, as a result of the appeal, the governmental entity is required to produce a record, the governmental 
entity shall: 
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(i) produce the record; and 
(ii) file a notice of compliance with the records committee. 
(d) (i) If the governmental entity that is ordered to produce a record fails to file a notice of 
compliance or a notice of intent to appeal, the records committee may do either or both of the following: 
(A) impose a civil penalty of up to $500 for each day of continuing noncompliance; or 
(B) send written notice of the governmental entity's noncompliance to: 
(I) the governor for executive branch entities; 
(II) the Legislative Management Committee for legislative branch entities; and 
(III) the Judicial Council for judicial branch agencies entities. 
(ii) In imposing a civil penalty, the records committee shall consider the gravity and circumstances of 
the violation, including whether the failure to comply was due to neglect or was willful or intentional. 
Amended by Chapter 284, 2006 General Session 
63-2-404. Judicial review. 
(1) (a) Any party to a proceeding before the records committee may petition for judicial review by 
the district court of the records committee's order. 
(b) The petition shall be filed no later than 30 days after the date of the records committee's order. 
(c) The records committee is a necessary party to the petition for judicial review. 
(d) The executive secretary of the records committee shall be served with notice of the petition in 
accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(2) (a) A requester may petition for judicial review by the district court of a governmental entity's 
determination as specified in Subsection 63-2-402 (l)(b). 
(b) The requester shall file a petition no later than: 
(i) 30 days after the governmental entity has responded to the records request by either providing the 
requested records or denying the request in whole or in part; 
(ii) 35 days after the original request if the governmental entity failed to respond to the request; or 
(iii) 45 days after the original request for records if: 
(A) the circumstances described in Subsection 63-2-401 (l)(b) occur; and 
(B) the chief administrative officer failed to make a determination under Section 63-2-401. 
(3) The petition for judicial review shall be a complaint governed by the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and shall contain: 
(a) the petitioner's name and mailing address; 
(b) a copy of the records committee order from which the appeal is taken, if the petitioner brought a 
prior appeal to the records committee; 
(c) the name and mailing address of the governmental entity that issued the initial determination with 
a copy of that determination; 
(d) a request for relief specifying the type and extent of relief requested; and 
(e) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to relief. 
(4) If the appeal is based on the denial of access to a protected record, the court shall allow the 
claimant of business confidentiality to provide to the court the reasons for the claim of business 
confidentiality. 
(5) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
(6) The district court may review the disputed records. The review shall be in camera. 
(7) The court shall: 
(a) make its decision de novo, but allow introduction of evidence presented to the records committee; 
(b) determine all questions of fact and law without a jury; and 
(c) decide the issue at the earliest practical opportunity. 
(8) (a) The court may, upon consideration and weighing of the various interests and public policies 
pertinent to the classification and disclosure or nondisclosure, order the disclosure of information 
properly classified as private, controlled, or protected if the interest favoring access outweighs the 
interest favoring restriction of access. 
(b) The court shall consider and, where appropriate, limit the requester's use and further disclosure of 
the record in order to protect privacy interests in the case of private or controlled 
records, business confidentiality interests in the case of records protected under Subsections 63-2-304(1) 
and (2), and privacy interests or the public interest in the case of other protected records. 
Amended by Chapter 133, 1995 General Session 
R35-1-4. Committee Minutes. 
(1) All meetings of the Committee shall be recorded. Access 
to the audio recordings shall be provided by the Executive 
Secretary at the Utah State Archives, Research Center. 
(2) Written minutes of the meetings and appeal hearings 
shall be maintained by the Executive Secretary. A copy of the 
approved minutes shall be made available for public access at the 
Utah State Archives. 
KEY: government documents, state records committee, records 
appeal hearings 
Date of Enactment or Last Substantive Amendment: August 9, 2 006 
Notice of Continuation: July 2, 2004 
Authorizing, and Implemented or Interpreted Law: 63-2-502(2)(a) 
R35. Administrative Services, Records Committee 
R3S-2. Declining Appeal Hearings. 
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heard at this time. If the Committee votes to hold f hearing, the 
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Executive Secretary shall schedule it on the agenda of the next 
regularly scheduled Committee meeting. 
(h) The Executive Secretary shall compile and include in an 
annual report to the Committee a complete documented list of all 
hearings held and all hearings declined. 
KEY: government documents, state records committee, records 
appeal hearings 
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Notice of Continuation July 2, 2004 
63-2-403(4) 
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Utah State Archives 
Page: 
AGENCY: Dept. of Public Safety 
SERIES: 2266 
TITLE: Annual reports 
VARIANT Biennial reports 
DATES: 1950-
ARRANGEMENT: Chronological 
DESCRIPTION: 
This series contains reports of Department of Public Safety 
activities from the previous year with information pertaining to 
agency activities, agency staff, public safety, drivers licenses, 
emergency management, law enforcement, criminal identification, 
crime, fire, peace officers, and fiscal and financial operations. 
RETENTION: 
Retain until transferred to the State Archives. 
DISPOSITION: 
Transfer to the State Archives with authority to weed. 
STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE STATUS: 
This retention was approved by the State Records Committee on 
07/01/1990. 
FORMAT MANAGEMENT: 
Paper: Retain in State Archives permanently with authority to 
weed. 
APPRAISAL: 
This disposition is based on Utah State General Records 
Retention Schedule, Schedule 1, Item 25. 
08/03/06 12:54 
Utah State Archives 
Page: 
AGENCY: Dept. of Public Safety 
SERIES: 81804 
TITLE: Records 
DATES: undated 
ARRANGEMENT: numerical 
DESCRIPTION: 
STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE STATUS: 
This retention has not been approved by the State Records Committee. 
FORMAT MANAGEMENT: 
Paper: Retain in Office until microfilmed and then destroy 
provided microfilm has passed inspection. 
Microfilm master: Retain in State Archives permanently with 
authority to weed. 
08/03/06 12:54 
Utah State Archives 
Page: 
AGENCY: Dept. of Public Safety. Investigation Division 
SERIES: 84406 
TITLE; Daily activity reports 
VARIANT DAR 
DATES: 1977-
ARRANGEMENT: Alphabetical by last name 
ANNUAL ACCUMULATION: 1.50 cubic feet. 
DESCRIPTION: 
These reports are used to monitor the daily activities of agents 
and personnel of the office and are used to aid in the 
preparation of the time sheets. They include information on the 
daily activities and contacts made by Bureau personnel, name, 
area working in, and all activities of the day. 
RETENTION: 
Retain 4 years. 
DISPOSITION: 
Destroy. 
STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE STATUS; 
This retention was approved by the State Records Committee on 
12/01/1989. 
FORMAT MANAGEMENT: 
Paper: Retain in Office for 1 year and then transfer to State 
Records Center. Retain in State Records Center for 3 years and 
then destroy. 
APPRAISAL: 
Administrative Fiscal 
The retention is based on the office need. 
PRIMARY CLASSIFICATION: 
Protected 
08/03/06 12:56 
Utah State Archives 
Page: 9 
AGENCY: Dept. of Public Safety. Investigation Division 
SERIES: 84410 3 
TITLE; Investigative case number book 
VARIANT Case Book 
DATES: 1969-
ARRANGEPENT: Numerical by case number 
ANNUAL ACCUMULATION: 
DESCRIPTION: 
This book is used to document the issuing of investigative case 
numbers and serves as a back-up to the index cards. This includes 
t h e
 case number, defendent's name, date, location, type of 
evidence, violation and the agent assigned to that particular 
case^ 
RETENTION: 
Retain 10 years. 
DISPOSITION: 
Destroy. 
STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE STATUS: 
This retention was approved by the State Records Committee on 
12/01/1989. 
FORMAT MANAGEMENT: 
Paper: Retain in Office for 10 years and then destroy. 
APPRAISAL: 
Administrative 
PRIMARY CLASSIFICATION: 
Protected 
/ 
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Utah State Archives 
Page: 11 
AGENCY: Dept. of Public Safety. Investigation Division 
SERIES: 84416 3 
TITLE: Law enforcement intelligence unit files 
VARIANT LEIU 
DATES: 1978-
ARRANGEMENT: Numerical by identification number, thereunder alphabetical by name 
ANNUAL ACCUMULATION: 10.00 cubic feet. 
DESCRIPTION: 
This file is used to gather information (intelligence) about 
persons, places, organizations, criminal or suspect. This would 
include a physical description, any information or knowledge of 
the past history of persons, criminal history, etc. This gathers 
and collects information nationwide with-law enforcement agencies 
all over the United States. 
RETENTION: 
Retain 7 years. 
DISPOSITION: 
Destroy. 
STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE STATUS: 
This retention was approved by the State Records Committee on 
12/01/1989. 
FORMAT MANAGEMENT: 
Paper: Retain in Office for 5 years and then transfer to State 
Records Center. Retain in State Records Center for 2 years and 
then destroy. 
Computer data files: Retain in Office for 7 years and then delete 
provided these files are reviewed every two years. 
APPRAISAL: 
Administrative Legal 
PRIMARY CLASSIFICATION: 
Protected 
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Utah State Archives 
Page: 
AGENCY: Dept. of Public Safety. Administrative Services Division 
SERIES: 10546 
TITLE: GRAMA correspondence and records 
DATES: 1992-
ARRANGEMENT: Alphabetical by surname 
ANNUAL ACCUMULATION: 0.50 cubic feet. 
DESCRIPTION: 
These are records related to the Government Records Access and 
Management Act (GRAMA) and the public's request for information. 
Included are request forms and correspondence. 
RETENTION: 
Retain 2 years after final agency action. 
DISPOSITION: 
Destroy. 
STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE STATUS: 
This retention was approved by the State Records Committee on 
07/01/1990. 
FORMAT MANAGEMENT: 
Paper: Retain in Office for 2 years after final agency action and 
then destroy. 
APPRAISAL: 
This disposition is based on Utah State General Records 
Retention Schedule, Schedule 1, Item 36. 
PRIMARY CLASSIFICATION: 
Public 
08/03/06 12:55 
Utah State Archives 
Page: 25 
AGENCY: Dept. of Public Safety. Division of Emergency Services and Homeland 
Security 
SERIES: 6314 
TITLE: Personnel records 
DATES: 1969-
ARRANGEMENT: Chronological, thereunder alphabetical by name 
TOTAL VOLUME: 
DESCRIPTION: 
Complete work history of individual while employed by the State. 
Refer to UCA 67-18-1, et seq. When an employee transfers to 
another state agency, the official personnel file must be sent to 
the new agency. 
RETENTION: 
Retain 65 years after separation of employee. 
DISPOSITION: 
Destroy. 
STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE STATUS: 
This retention was approved by the State Records Committee on 
12/01/1992. 
FORMAT MANAGEMENT: 
Paper: Retain in Office until separation of employee and then 
transfer to State Records Center. Retain in State Records Center 
for 65 years and then destroy. 
APPRAISAL: 
This disposition is based on Utah State General Records 
Retention Schedule, Schedule 11, Item 2. 
PRIMARY CLASSIFICATION: 
Private 
SECONDARY CLASSIFICATION(S): 
Public. Eighteen personal data elements identified by the State 
Records Committee 
08/03/06 12:55 
Utah State Archives 
Page: 
AGENCY: Dept. of Public Safety. Division of Emergency Services and Homeland 
Security 
SERIES: 16944 
TITLE: Correspondence with the Department of Public Safety 
DATES: 1979-
ARRANGEMENT: Chronological 
ANNUAL ACCUMULATION: 
DESCRIPTION: 
These are correspondence and memoranda of the Commissioner of 
Public Safety to and from the Division of Comprehensive Emergency 
Management. Issues discussed include personnel matters, reports 
from Police Officers Standards and Training (POST), and the 
internal management of the division. These records include names, 
addresses, personnel issues, management issues of the division, 
and POST reports. 
STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE STATUS: 
This retention was approved by the State Records Committee on 
03/01/1987. 
FORMAT MANAGEMENT: 
Paper: Retain in Office for 1 year and then transfer to State 
Records Center. Retain in State Records Center for 4 years and 
then transfer to State Archives with authority to weed. 
APPRAISAL: 
Administrative Historical 
Because this is administrative and program management 
correspondence indicating the relation of the division to the 
goals of Public Safety and the development of policies concerning 
civil defense, a permanent retention is needed. 
PRIMARY CLASSIFICATION: 
Public 
SECONDARY CLASSIFICATIONS): 
Private. Personnel issues not among the 18 personal data elements 
identified by the State Records Committee. 
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Utah State Archives 
Page: 14 
AGENCY: Dept. of Public Safety. Investigation Division 
SERIES: 84409 3 
TITLE: Requests for Bureau of Criminal Identification records 
VARIANT BCI Checks 
DATES: 1987-
ARRANGEMENT: Chronological 
ANNUAL ACCUMULATION: 0.50 cubic feet. 
DESCRIPTION: 
These records are required by the Bureau of Criminal 
Identification. These checks are recorded and filed for audit 
purposes. This includes the requesting person, BCI number, 
individual's name (subject of search), and subject's date of 
birth. 
RETENTION: 
Retain 3 years. 
DISPOSITION: 
Destroy. 
STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE STATUS: 
This retention was approved by the State Records Committee on 
12/01/1989. 
FORMAT MANAGEMENT: 
Paper: Retain in Office for 3 years and then destroy. 
APPRAISAL: 
Administrative Legal 
PRIMARY CLASSIFICATION: 
Protected 
I60 
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Utah State Archives 
Page: 
AGENCY: Dept. of Public Safety. Investigation Division 
SERIES: 84381 
TITLE; Suspect files index 
DATES: 1969-
ARRANGEMENT: Alphabetical by last name of suspect 
ANNUAL ACCUMULATION: 1.00 cubic foot. 
DESCRIPTION: 
This is the manual index used to locate files maintained on 
suspects of the Utah Division of Investigation. The card states 
the case number, date of initiation of the case, suspect's name, 
date of birth, physical description, vehicle description, 
substance purchased and amount purchased, and any violations 
which relate back to the investigative file. 
RETENTION: 
Retain 10 years after investigation is closed. 
DISPOSITION: 
Destroy. 
STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE STATUS: 
This retention was approved by the State Records Committee on 
12/01/1989. 
FORMAT MANAGEMENT: 
Paper: Retain in Office for 10 years after investigation closed 
and then destroy. 
APPRAISAL: 
Administrative Legal 
PRIMARY CLASSIFICATION: 
Protected 
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Utah State Archives 
Page: 
AGENCY: Dept. of Public Safety. Investigation Division 
SERIES: 84411 
TITLE: Nationwide check of FBI records 
VARIANT III Checks 
DATES: 1987-
ARRANGEMENT: Chronological 
ANNUAL ACCUMULATION: 0.50 cubic feet. 
DESCRIPTION: 
These records are required by regulations from the Bureau of 
Criminal Identification, and are recorded and filed for audit 
purposes. These include the person's name and date of birth, 
requester's initials and the date check was run. 
RETENTION: 
Retain until case is closed. 
DISPOSITION: 
Destroy. 
STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE STATUS: 
This retention was approved by the State Records Committee on 
12/01/1989. 
FORMAT MANAGEMENT: 
Paper: Retain in Office until case is closed and then destroy. 
APPRAISAL: 
Administrative 
PRIMARY CLASSIFICATION: 
Protected 
na/m/ne -IO.CO 
Utah State Archives 
Page: 
AGENCY: State Records Committee 
SERIES: 24018 
TITLE: Annual Reports 
DATES: 1999-
ARRANGEMENT: Chronological 
ANNUAL ACCUMULATION: 0.10 cubic feet. 
DESCRIPTION: 
These records document the appeal requests sent to the State 
Records Committee each year. The information summarizes the cases 
for which hearings are scheduled as well as those declined or 
otherwise remedied without a hearing. 
RETENTION: 
Retain 7 years. 
DISPOSITION: 
Transfer to the State Archives with authority to weed. 
STATE RECORDS COMMITTEE STATUS: 
This retention was approved by the State Records Committee on 
07/01/1990. 
FORMAT MANAGEMENT: 
Paper: Retain in Office for 5 years and then transfer to State 
Records Center. Retain in State Records Center for 2 years and 
then transfer to State Archives. 
Computer data files: Retain in Office until administrative need 
ends and then delete. 
APPRAISAL: 
Fiscal 
This disposition is based on Utah State General Records 
Retention Schedule, Schedule 1, Item 25. 
PRIMARY CLASSIFICATION: 
Public 
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Rule 4. Process. 
(a) Signing of summons The summons shall be signed and issued by the plaintiff or the plaintiffs attorney Separate 
summonses may be signed and served 
(b)(i) Time of service In an action commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the summons together with a copy of the complaint 
shall be served no later than 120 days after the filing of the complaint unless the court allows a longer period of time for 
good cause shown If the summons and complaint are not timely served, the action shall be dismissed, without 
prejudice on application of any party or upon the court's own initiative 
(b)(n) In any action brought against two or more defendants on which service has been timely obtained upon one of 
them, 
(b)(n)(A) the plaintiff may proceed against those served, and 
(b)(n)(B) the others may be served or appear at any time prior to trial 
(c) Contents of summons 
(c)(1) The summons shall contain the name of the court, the address of the court, the names of the parties to the 
action, and the county in which it is brought It shall be directed to the defendant, state the name, address and 
telephone number of the plaintiff's attorney, if any, and otherwise the plaintiffs address and telephone number It shall 
state the time within which the defendant is required to answer the complaint in writing, and shall notify the defendant 
that in case of failure to do so, judgment by default will be rendered against the defendant It shall state either that the 
complaint is on file with the court or that the complaint will be filed with the court within ten days of service 
(c)(2) If the action is commenced under Rule 3(a)(2), the summons shall state that the defendant need not answer if 
the complaint is not filed within 10 days after service and shall state the telephone number of the clerk of the court 
where the defendant may call at least 13 days after service to determine if the complaint has been filed 
(c)(3) If seivice is made by publication, the summons shall briefly state the subject matter and the sum of money or 
other relief demanded, and that the complaint is on file with the court 
(d) Method of Service Unless waived in writing, service of the summons and complaint shall be by one of the following 
methods 
(d)(1) Personal service The summons and complaint may be served in any state or judicial district of the United States 
by the sheriff or constable or by the deputy of either, by a United States Marshal or by the marshal's deputy, or by any 
other person 18 years of age or older at the time of service and not a party to the action or a party's attorney If the 
person to be served refuses to accept a copy of the process, service shall be sufficient if the person serving the same 
shall state the name of the process and offer to deliver a copy thereof Personal service shall be made as follows 
(d)(1 )(A) Upon any individual other than one covered by subparagraphs (B), (C) or (D) below, by delivering a copy of 
the summons and the complaint to the individual personally, or by leaving a copy at the individual's dwelling house or 
usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion there residing, or by delivering a copy of the 
summons and the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process, 
(d)(1)(B) Upon an infant (being a person under 14 years) by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the 
infant and also to the infant's father, mother or guardian or, if none can be found within the state, then to any person 
having the care and control of the infant, or with whom the infant resides, or in whose service the infant is employed, 
(d)(1)(C) Upon an individual judicially declared to be of unsound mind or incapable of conducting the person's own 
affairs, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the person and to the person's legal representative if 
one has been appointed and in the absence of such representative, to the individual, if any, who has care, custody or 
control of the person, 
(d)(1 )(D) Upon an individual incarcerated or committed at a facility operated by the state or any of its political 
subdivisions, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the person who has the care, custody, or 
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control of the individual to be served, or to that person's designee or to the guardian or conservator of the individual to 
be served if one has been appointed, who shall, in any case, promptly deliver the process to the individual served, 
(d)(1)(E) Upon any corporation not herein otherwise provided for, upon a partnership or upon an unincorporated 
association which is subject to suit under a common name, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to 
an officer, a managing or general agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of 
process and, if the agent is one authorized by statute to receive service and the statute so requires, by also mailing a 
copy of the summons and the complaint to the defendant If no such officer or agent can be found within the state, and 
the defendant has, or advertises or holds itself out as having, an office or place of business within the state or 
elsewhere, or does business within this state or elsewhere, then upon the person in charge of such office or place of 
business, 
(d)(1)(F) Upon an incorporated city or town, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the recorder, 
(d)(1)(G) Upon a county, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the county clerk of such county, 
(d)(1 )(H) Upon a school district or board of education, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the 
superintendent or business administrator of the board, 
(d)(1)(l) Upon an irrigation or drainage district, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to the president 
or secretary of its board 
(d)(1)(J) Upon the state of Utah, in such cases as by law are authorized to be brought against the state, by delivering a 
copy of the summons and the complaint to the attorney general and any other person or agency required by statute to 
be served, and 
(d)(1 )(K) Upon a department or agency of the state of Utah, or upon any public board, commission or body, subject to 
suit, by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to any member of its governing board, or to its executive 
employee or secretary 
(d)(2) Service by mail or commercial courier service 
(d)(2)(A) The summons and complaint may be served upon an individual other than one covered by paragraphs (d)(1) 
(B) or (d)(1 )(C) by mail or commercial courier service in any state or judicial district of the United States provided the 
defendant signs a document indicating receipt 
(d)(2)(B) The summons and complaint may be served upon an entity covered by paragraphs (d)(1)(E) through (d)(1)(l) 
by mail or commercial courier service in any state or judicial district of the United States provided defendant's agent 
authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process signs a document indicating receipt 
(d)(2)(C) Service by mail or commercial courier service shall be complete on the date the receipt is signed as provided 
by this rule 
(d)(3) Service in a foreign country Service in a foreign country shall be made as follows: 
(d)(3)(A) by any internationally agreed means reasonably calculated to give notice, such as those means authorized by 
the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents, 
(d)(3)(B) if there is no internationally agreed means of service or the applicable international agreement allows other 
means of service, provided that service is reasonably calculated to give notice 
(d)(3)(B)(i) in the manner prescribed by the law of the foreign country for service in that country in an action in any of its 
courts of general jurisdiction, 
(d)(3)(B)(n) as directed by the foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory or letter of request, or 
(d)(3)(B)(m) unless prohibited by the law of the foreign country, by delivery to the individual personally of a copy of the 
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summons and the complaint or by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched by the 
clerk of the court to the party to be served, or 
(d)(3)(C) by other means not prohibited by international agreement as may be directed by the court. 
(d)(4) Other service 
(d)(4)(A) Where the identity or whereabouts of the person to be served are unknown and cannot be ascertained 
through reasonable diligence, where service upon all of the individual parties is impracticable under the circumstances, 
or where there exists good cause to believe that the person to be served is avoiding service of process, the party 
seeking service of process may file a motion supported by affidavit requesting an order allowing service by publication 
or by some other means The supporting affidavit shall set forth the efforts made to identify, locate or serve the party to 
be served, or the circumstances which make it impracticable to serve all of the individual parties 
(d)(4)(B) If the motion is granted, the court shall order service of process by publication or by other means, provided 
that the means of notice employed shall be reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the 
interested parties of the pendency of the action to the extent reasonably possible or practicable The court's order shall 
also specify the content of the process to be served and the event or events as of which service shall be deemed 
complete Unless service is by publication, a copy of the court's order shall be served upon the defendant with the 
process specified by the court 
(d)(4)(C) In any proceeding where summons is required to be published, the court shall, upon the request of the party 
applying for publication, designate the newspaper in which publication shall be made The newspaper selected shall be 
a newspaper of general circulation in the county where such publication is required to be made and shall be published 
in the English language 
(e) Proof of Service 
(e)(1) If service is not waived, the person effecting service shall file proof with the court The proof of service must state 
the date place, and manner of service Proof of service made pursuant to paragraph (d)(2) shall include a receipt 
signed by the defendant or defendant's agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process If 
service is made by a person other than by an attorney, the sheriff or constable, or by the deputy of either, by a United 
States Marshal or by the marshal's deputy, the proof of service shall be made by affidavit 
(e)(2) Proof of service in a foreign country shall be made as prescribed in these rules for service within this state, or by 
the law of the foreign country, or by order of the court When service is made pursuant to paragraph (d)(3)(C), proof of 
service shall include a receipt signed by the addressee or other evidence of delivery to the addressee satisfactory to 
the court 
(e)(3) Failure to make proof of service does not affect the validity of the service The court may allow proof of service to 
be amended 
(f) Waiver of Service, Payment of Costs for Refusing to Waive 
(f)(1) A plaintiff may request a defendant subject to service under paragraph (d) to waive service of a summons The 
request shall be mailed or delivered to the person upon whom service is authorized under paragraph (d) It shall 
include a copy of the complaint, shall allow the defendant at least 20 days from the date on which the request is sent to 
return the waiver, or 30 days if addressed to a defendant outside of the United States, and shall be substantially in the 
form of the Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of Summons set forth in the Appendix of Forms 
attached to these rules 
(f)(2) A defendant who timely returns a waiver is not required to respond to the complaint until 45 days after the date on 
which the request for waiver of service was mailed or delivered to the defendant, or 60 days after that date if 
addressed to a defendant outside of the United States 
(f)(3) A defendant who waives service of a summons does not thereby waive any objection to venue or to the 
jurisdiction of the court over the defendant 
(f)(4) if a defendant refuses a request for waiver of service submitted in accordance with this rule, the court shall 
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impose upon the defendant the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
State Court Rules 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos) 
" 1 Part VI. Trials 
••RULE 52. FINDINGS BY THE COURT 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall 
find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be 
entered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall 
similarly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the grounds of its 
action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, whether 
based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due 
regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses The 
findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of 
the court. I t will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and 
recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written 
statement of the ground for its decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, 
and 59 when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the 
court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. 
The motion may be made with a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are 
made in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not the party raising the question has made 
in the district court an objection to such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a 
motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Except in actions for divorce, findings of 
fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
[Amended effective January 1, 1987.] 
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Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant A paity seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory 
judgment may at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a 
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof 
(b) For defending party A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory 
judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7 The 
judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or 
for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and 
the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without 
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted It shall thereupon make an 
order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy including the extent to which the amount of 
damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just Upon the 
trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly 
(e) Form of affidavits, further testimony, defense required Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith The court may permit affidavits to be 
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits When a motion for summary 
judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial Summary judgment if appropriate, shall be entered against a party 
failing to file such a response 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party 
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essentia! to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or 
solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused including reasonable attorney's fees, and 
any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt 
